That is true. To pressupose an experience of self in others is a leap
on faith based on similarity. It is duck philosophy. What seems a
Duck, must be a Duck. Even Hume had to limit its destructive
philosophy to avoid self destructiveness. Because there are core
beliefs that we don´t doubt, or we can not doubt seriously because we
can´t accept that this is just a belief without acting self
destructively. That is in the first place the reason why these beliefs
exist: they must have been selected and hardcoded by evolution. That
must be the ultimate meaning of truth in evolutionary epistemology.
In the same way, a self conscious robot must have beliefs about itself
and others. he believe that he is conscious. He can not conceive
otherwise. And their sensations must be according with this belief.
His belief can not be a boolean switch in a program. He must answer
sincerely to questions about existence, perception and so on.
But still after this reasoning, I doubt that the self conscious
philosopher robot have the kind of thing, call it a soul, that I have.
2012/10/9 Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net>:
> Hi Alberto G. Corona and Bruno,
>
> Perhaps I can express the problem of solipsism as this.
> To have a mind means that one can experience.
> Experiences are subjective and thus cannot be actually shared,
> the best one can do is share a description of the experience.
> If one cannot actually share another's experience,
> one cannot know if they actually had an experience--
> that is, that they actually have a mind.
>
> Comp seems to avoid this insurmountable problem
> by avoiding the issue of whether the computer
> actually had an experience, only that it appeared
> to have an experience. So comp's requirement
> is "as if" rather than "is".
>
>
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
> 10/9/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> From: Alberto G. Corona
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-10-08, 15:12:22
> Subject: Re: What Kant did: Consciousness is a top-down structuring
> ofbottom-up sensory info
>
>
> Bruno:
>
> It could be that the indeterminacy in the I means that everything else
> is not a machine, but supposedly, an hallucination.
> But this hallucination has a well defined set of mathematical
> properties that are communicable to other hallucinated expectators.
> This means that something is keeping the picture coherent. If that
> something is not computation or computations, what is the nature of
> this well behaving hallucination according with your point of view?
>
>
> 2012/10/7 Bruno Marchal :
>>
>> On 07 Oct 2012, at 15:11, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> 2012/10/7 Bruno Marchal
>>>
>>>
>>> On 07 Oct 2012, at 12:32, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
>>>
>>> Hi Roger:
>>>
>>> ... and cognitive science , which study the hardware and evolutionary
>>> psychology (that study the software or mind) assert that this is true.
>>>
>>>
>>> Partially true, as both the mainstream cognitive science and psychology
>>> still does not address the mind-body issue, even less the comp particular
>>> mind-body issue. In fact they use comp + weak materialism, which can be
>>> shown contradictory(*).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The Kant idea that even space and time are creations of the mind is
>>> crucial for the understanding and to compatibilize the world of perceptions
>>> and phenomena with the timeless, reversible, mathematical nature of the
>>> laws of physics that by the way, according with M Theory, have also
>>> dualities between the entire universe and the interior of a brane on the
>>> planck scale (we can not know if we live in such a small brane).
>>>
>>>
>>> OK. No doubt that Kant was going in the right (with respect to comp at
>>> least) direction. But Kant, for me, is just doing 1/100 of what the
>>> neoplatonists already did.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I don? assume either if this mathematical nature is or not the ultimate
>>> nature or reality
>>>
>>>
>>> Any Turing universal part of it is enough for the ontology, in the comp
>>> frame. For the epistemology, no mathematical theories can ever be enough.
>>> Arithmetic viewed from inside is bigger than what *any* theory can describe
>>> completely. This makes comp preventing any text to capture the essence of
>>> what being conscious can mean, be it a bible, string theory, or Peano
>>> Arithmetic. In a sense such theories are like "new person", and it put only
>>> more mess in Platonia.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Probably the mind (or more specifically each instantiation of the mind
>>> along the line of life in space-time) make use a sort of duality in
>>> category theory between topological spaces and algebraic structures (as
>>> Stephen told me and he can explain you) .
>>>
>>>
>>> Many dualities exist, but as I have try to explain to Stephen, mind and
>>> matter are not symmetrical things if we assume comp. The picture is more
>>> that matter is an iceberg tip of "reality".
>>>
>> Even if matter the tip of the iceberg, does the rest of if "matter"?
>>
>>
>> Without the rest (water), there would be no iceberg and no tip!
>>
>>
>>
>> do we can know about it this submerged computational nature?
>>
>>
>> In science we never know. But we can bet on comp, and then, we can "know"
>> relatively to that bet-theory. So with comp we know that the rest is the
>> external and internal math structures in arithmetic.
>>
>>
>>
>> which phenomena produce the submerged part of this iceberg in the one that
>> we perceive?.
>>
>>
>> Arithmetic gives the submerged part. The UD complete execution gives it too.
>> The emerged part is given by the first person indeterminacy.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Multiverse hypothesis propose a collection of infinite icebergs, but this is
>> a way to avoid God and to continue with the speculative business. What the
>> computational nature of reality tries to explain or to avoid? . May be you
>> answered this questions a number of times, ( even to me and I did not
>> realize it)
>>
>>
>> Careful. Comp makes the observable reality of physics, and the non
>> observable reality of the mind, NON computational. Indeed it needs a God
>> (arithmetical truth). It explains also why God is NOT arithmetical truth as
>> we usually defined it (it is only an approximation).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> By the way, Bruno, you try to demolish physicalism from below by proposing a
>> computational theory of ultimate reality.
>>
>>
>> Not at all. many are confuse about this. This is the confusion between comp
>> and digital physics. Comp is just the bet that "I" am a machine. Not that
>> reality is computational. Comp makes reality ultra-non-computational, like
>> arithmetical truth is already ultra-non-computational. The computational =
>> Sigma_1 complete. Above it is not computational, and arithmetical truth is
>> the union of all sigma_i (Sigma_0 U Sigma_1 Sigma_3 U Sigma_4 U Sigma_5 U
>> Sigma_6 U Sigma_7 U ...).
>>
>> Digital physics, although perhaps useful, is contradictory at the start, as
>> it implies comp, but if you get the UDA, you can understand that comp
>> entails non digital physics. By transitivity, this shows that Digital
>> physics entails non-digital physics, and so digital physics is refuted (with
>> or without comp).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> I try to demolish it from above, by proposing that perceptions are the
>> effect of computation in living beings for survival .
>>
>>
>> OK. But you have to assume some sort of reality to define "survival" and to
>> define what is surviving.
>>
>>
>>
>> I assume, and I make use of it, that the comp hypothesis can also be applied
>> at a level above phisical reality instead of below: a substitution at the
>> axon firing level could be used to substitute a part of the brain by
>> computer chips (by making the chips to inject axonic signals) + perhaps some
>> hormonal control. This substitution level Matrix-style can produce the same
>> first person indeterminacy and still the computation is made within this
>> reality, by real computers made of ordinary matter.
>>
>>
>> It will work for you, as an external observer for the matrix. But it will
>> NOT work for the people inside the matrix, as they will not stay in that
>> matrix for long, as their reality is the "real" arithmetical matrix. In fact
>> physical computation just don't capture consciousness. Physical reality is
>> completely a product of consciousness, and consciousness is a statistical
>> product of *all* computations.
>> This is something hard to explain, without going through the whole UDA
>> reasoning.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> This is enough for a discussion.
>>
>>
>> With "by real computers made of ordinary matter." I mean that the computers
>> are structures within the mathematical manifold that describe the physical
>> reality (or the tip of the iceberg).
>>
>>
>> But with comp, the physical reality cannot be taken for granted. You *have
>> to* extract it from the logic of the sigma_1 sentences structured by the
>> person points of view. (unless a flaw in UDA).
>>
>> I don't try to demolish physicalism. I just show that it cannot work once we
>> assume comp. Without AUDA, I would say that I just translate the mind-body
>> problem into a problem of justifying the hallucination of matter from
>> arithmetic.
>> Then, AUDA gives the method and the non trivial first results. There is
>> already an arithmetical quantization, and it is just beyond my competence to
>> show if it simulates a quantum computer or not.
>>
>> Many philosophers (especially academical and atheists) hates this as it
>> makes the mind-body problem into a technical problem, and then it is against
>> the current weakly-materialist dogma favored by the most common current
>> ideologies.
>>
>> The global picture is the same as the one described by the mystics, though,
>> as we can say thanks to that greek period where mysticism was the best ally
>> to science. Indeed the greek created the science from that insight, theology
>> included.
>>
>> Please keep in mind that: "I am a machine (comp) implies that everything
>> else (matter, consciousness) is NOT a machine".
>>
>> "I am a machine" is an abbreviation for CT+ "yes doctor" (the "I" is
>> ambiguous).
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Eventually matter emerge from dreams coherence conditions. Dreams are just
>>> the first person view on the relevant computations which exists by
>>> elementary arithmetic.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> For the perception of time or for the ordering of past events in time
>>> since future events are unknown due to the increasing entropy, the mind
>>> would make use of another mathematical structure with a relation of order.
>>>
>>>
>>> I agree, and N = {0, s(0), s(s(0)), ... } is quite enough, at least with
>>> the addition and multiplication laws. You can define the order by the order
>>> relation x < y, that you can define for example by Ez(x + z = y & ~(z = 0)).
>>> That order is enough to define the order of the computational steps in any
>>> computations.
>>>
>>> With computationalism, physics is *literally* entirely reducible to
>>> computer science (= number theory or combinator theory), in a sense similar
>>> to the fact that current biology is literally reducible to chemistry, itself
>>> reducible to physics. Note that computer science refers to number crunching
>>> and syntactical manipulations, but also to the many semantics of programs
>>> and computations, like Scott denotational semantics, or like those derived
>>> from mathematical logic (self-reference theory, model theory, Curry-Howard
>>> isomorphism, etc.).
>>>
>>> Here, the use of self-reference makes it possible to explain the *whole*
>>> of physics: that is the quanta *and* the qualia together, and why they seems
>>> (and are) different. All universal numbers, when looking inward, find that
>>> same universal qualia-quanta distinctions. Note this makes comp testable, as
>>> you can compare the quanta behavior found by machine introspection with what
>>> we can observe, and in that sense, we can say that QM-without-collapse is
>>> quite an ally, up to now, to the comp postulate. Newton physics, once
>>> assessed, would have violate the comp theory.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>> (*)
>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
>>>
>>>
>>> 2012/10/6 Roger Clough
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> http://www.friesian.com/kant.htm
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Kant's "Copernican Revolution"
>>>>
>>>> " Kant's most original contribution to philosophy is his "Copernican
>>>> Revolution,"
>>>> that, as he puts it, it is the representation that makes the object
>>>> possible
>>>> rather than the object that makes the representation possible. This
>>>> introduced
>>>> the human mind as an active originator of experience rather than just a
>>>> passive
>>>> recipient of perception. Something like this now seems obvious: the mind
>>>> could
>>>> be a tabula rasa, a "blank tablet," no more than a bathtub full of
>>>> silicon chips
>>>> could be a digital computer. Perceptual input must be processed, i.e.
>>>> recognized,
>>>> or it would just be noise -- "less even than a dream" or "nothing to us,"
>>>> as Kant
>>>> alternatively puts it. "
>>>> .
>>>>
>>>> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
>>>> 10/6/2012
>>>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ----- Receiving the following content -----
>>>> From: Craig Weinberg
>>>> Receiver: everything-list
>>>> Time: 2012-10-05, 10:42:30
>>>> Subject: Re: A "grand hypothesis" about order, life, and consciousness
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Friday, October 5, 2012 7:05:06 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> So it is reasonable to define life as that which can produce order
>>>> out of chaos" *. Since at least higher living beings
>>>> also possess consciousness, my "grand" hypothesis is that
>>>>
>>>> life = consciousness = awareness = producing order out of chaos.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I agree Roger. I would add to this understanding however, a logarithmic
>>>> sense of increasing quality of experience.
>>>>
>>>> human experience = consciousness > animal experience = awareness >
>>>> microbiotic experience = sensation > inorganic experience = persistence of
>>>> functions and structures.
>>>>
>>>> I would not say producing order out of chaos because I think that chaos
>>>> is not primordial. Nonsense is a mismatch or attenuation of sense, not the
>>>> other way around. Order cannot be produced from chaos unless chaos
>>>> implicitly contains the potential for order...which makes the production of
>>>> orderly appearance really just a formality.
>>>>
>>>> Craig
>>>>
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>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> Alberto.
>>>
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>>>
>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Alberto.
>>
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>>
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>
>
>
> --
> Alberto.
>
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