On 09 Oct 2012, at 11:50, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Alberto G. Corona  and Bruno,

Perhaps I can express the problem of solipsism as this.
To have a mind means that one can experience.

Hmm... Not really, with "my terminology". A mind is not enough for an experience. You need a soul. It is a fixed point in a transformation of the mind to itself. I can conceive mind without soul. But OK. It is a detail perhaps here.




Experiences are subjective and thus cannot be actually shared,
the best one can do is share a description of the experience.

Not really. You can share the pleasure you have about a movie, by describing the movie and your feeling.

But, if you know your partner very well, you can share the experience of the movie, partially, by going together at the movie projection.
Sharing does not necessitate communication.





If one cannot actually share another's experience,
one cannot know if they actually had an experience--
that is, that they actually have a mind.

Indeed. But even in dream we have instinctive empathy, and have good reason (even if *sometimes* false) to bet other people have experience.




Comp seems to avoid this insurmountable problem
by avoiding the issue of whether the computer
actually had an experience, only that it appeared
to have an experience.  So comp's requirement
is "as if" rather than "is".


Not at all. This is BEH-MEC (behavioral mechanism). Already STRONG-AI (weaker than comp) makes precise that it postulates that machine can be conscious, even independently of behavior. Then COMP is stronger that STRON AI, as it postulates that YOU are a machine, and that your experience (which is of course assumed to exist for the rest making sense) is invariant for some digital transformation.


Please try to not deform the hypothesis. Comp is a postulate in a theory of consciousness, experience, subjective life, etc. It is an axiom, or an hypothesis, or a question (quasi synomym for my purpose) of the cognitive science.

We have COMP ===> STRONG AI ====> BEH-MEC,

But none of those arrows can be reversed, logically.

Bruno






Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/9/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Alberto G. Corona
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-08, 15:12:22
Subject: Re: What Kant did: Consciousness is a top-down structuring ofbottom-up sensory info


Bruno:

It could be that the indeterminacy in the I means that everything else
is not a machine, but supposedly, an hallucination.
But this hallucination has a well defined set of mathematical
properties that are communicable to other hallucinated expectators.
This means that something is keeping the picture coherent. If that
something is not computation or computations, what is the nature of
this well behaving hallucination according with your point of view?


2012/10/7 Bruno Marchal :

On 07 Oct 2012, at 15:11, Alberto G. Corona wrote:



2012/10/7 Bruno Marchal


On 07 Oct 2012, at 12:32, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

Hi Roger:

... and cognitive science , which study the hardware and evolutionary psychology (that study the software or mind) assert that this is true.


Partially true, as both the mainstream cognitive science and psychology still does not address the mind-body issue, even less the comp particular mind-body issue. In fact they use comp + weak materialism, which can be
shown contradictory(*).




The Kant idea that even space and time are creations of the mind is
crucial for the understanding and to compatibilize the world of perceptions and phenomena with the timeless, reversible, mathematical nature of the
laws of physics that by the way, according with M Theory, have also
dualities between the entire universe and the interior of a brane on the
planck scale (we can not know if we live in such a small brane).


OK. No doubt that Kant was going in the right (with respect to comp at
least) direction. But Kant, for me, is just doing 1/100 of what the
neoplatonists already did.



I don? assume either if this mathematical nature is or not the ultimate
nature or reality


Any Turing universal part of it is enough for the ontology, in the comp frame. For the epistemology, no mathematical theories can ever be enough. Arithmetic viewed from inside is bigger than what *any* theory can describe completely. This makes comp preventing any text to capture the essence of what being conscious can mean, be it a bible, string theory, or Peano Arithmetic. In a sense such theories are like "new person", and it put only
more mess in Platonia.




Probably the mind (or more specifically each instantiation of the mind
along the line of life in space-time) make use a sort of duality in
category theory between topological spaces and algebraic structures (as
Stephen told me and he can explain you) .


Many dualities exist, but as I have try to explain to Stephen, mind and matter are not symmetrical things if we assume comp. The picture is more
that matter is an iceberg tip of "reality".

Even if matter the tip of the iceberg, does the rest of if "matter"?


Without the rest (water), there would be no iceberg and no tip!



do we can know about it this submerged computational nature?


In science we never know. But we can bet on comp, and then, we can "know" relatively to that bet-theory. So with comp we know that the rest is the
external and internal math structures in arithmetic.



which phenomena produce the submerged part of this iceberg in the one that
we perceive?.


Arithmetic gives the submerged part. The UD complete execution gives it too.
The emerged part is given by the first person indeterminacy.




Multiverse hypothesis propose a collection of infinite icebergs, but this is a way to avoid God and to continue with the speculative business. What the computational nature of reality tries to explain or to avoid? . May be you
answered this questions a number of times, ( even to me and I did not
realize it)


Careful. Comp makes the observable reality of physics, and the non
observable reality of the mind, NON computational. Indeed it needs a God (arithmetical truth). It explains also why God is NOT arithmetical truth as
we usually defined it (it is only an approximation).




By the way, Bruno, you try to demolish physicalism from below by proposing a
computational theory of ultimate reality.


Not at all. many are confuse about this. This is the confusion between comp and digital physics. Comp is just the bet that "I" am a machine. Not that reality is computational. Comp makes reality ultra-non- computational, like arithmetical truth is already ultra-non-computational. The computational = Sigma_1 complete. Above it is not computational, and arithmetical truth is the union of all sigma_i (Sigma_0 U Sigma_1 Sigma_3 U Sigma_4 U Sigma_5 U
Sigma_6 U Sigma_7 U ...).

Digital physics, although perhaps useful, is contradictory at the start, as
it implies comp, but if you get the UDA, you can understand that comp
entails non digital physics. By transitivity, this shows that Digital
physics entails non-digital physics, and so digital physics is refuted (with
or without comp).





I try to demolish it from above, by proposing that perceptions are the
effect of computation in living beings for survival .


OK. But you have to assume some sort of reality to define "survival" and to
define what is surviving.



I assume, and I make use of it, that the comp hypothesis can also be applied at a level above phisical reality instead of below: a substitution at the
axon firing level could be used to substitute a part of the brain by
computer chips (by making the chips to inject axonic signals) + perhaps some hormonal control. This substitution level Matrix-style can produce the same first person indeterminacy and still the computation is made within this
reality, by real computers made of ordinary matter.


It will work for you, as an external observer for the matrix. But it will NOT work for the people inside the matrix, as they will not stay in that matrix for long, as their reality is the "real" arithmetical matrix. In fact physical computation just don't capture consciousness. Physical reality is completely a product of consciousness, and consciousness is a statistical
product of *all* computations.
This is something hard to explain, without going through the whole UDA
reasoning.




This is enough for a discussion.


With "by real computers made of ordinary matter." I mean that the computers are structures within the mathematical manifold that describe the physical
reality (or the tip of the iceberg).


But with comp, the physical reality cannot be taken for granted. You *have to* extract it from the logic of the sigma_1 sentences structured by the
person points of view. (unless a flaw in UDA).

I don't try to demolish physicalism. I just show that it cannot work once we assume comp. Without AUDA, I would say that I just translate the mind-body
problem into a problem of justifying the hallucination of matter from
arithmetic.
Then, AUDA gives the method and the non trivial first results. There is already an arithmetical quantization, and it is just beyond my competence to
show if it simulates a quantum computer or not.

Many philosophers (especially academical and atheists) hates this as it makes the mind-body problem into a technical problem, and then it is against the current weakly-materialist dogma favored by the most common current
ideologies.

The global picture is the same as the one described by the mystics, though, as we can say thanks to that greek period where mysticism was the best ally to science. Indeed the greek created the science from that insight, theology
included.

Please keep in mind that: "I am a machine (comp) implies that everything
else (matter, consciousness) is NOT a machine".

"I am a machine" is an abbreviation for CT+ "yes doctor" (the "I" is
ambiguous).

Bruno





Eventually matter emerge from dreams coherence conditions. Dreams are just
the first person view on the relevant computations which exists by
elementary arithmetic.




For the perception of time or for the ordering of past events in time since future events are unknown due to the increasing entropy, the mind would make use of another mathematical structure with a relation of order.


I agree, and N = {0, s(0), s(s(0)), ... } is quite enough, at least with the addition and multiplication laws. You can define the order by the order relation x < y, that you can define for example by Ez(x + z = y & ~(z = 0)). That order is enough to define the order of the computational steps in any
computations.

With computationalism, physics is *literally* entirely reducible to
computer science (= number theory or combinator theory), in a sense similar to the fact that current biology is literally reducible to chemistry, itself reducible to physics. Note that computer science refers to number crunching and syntactical manipulations, but also to the many semantics of programs and computations, like Scott denotational semantics, or like those derived from mathematical logic (self-reference theory, model theory, Curry-Howard
isomorphism, etc.).

Here, the use of self-reference makes it possible to explain the *whole* of physics: that is the quanta *and* the qualia together, and why they seems (and are) different. All universal numbers, when looking inward, find that same universal qualia-quanta distinctions. Note this makes comp testable, as you can compare the quanta behavior found by machine introspection with what we can observe, and in that sense, we can say that QM-without- collapse is quite an ally, up to now, to the comp postulate. Newton physics, once
assessed, would have violate the comp theory.

Bruno


(*)
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html


2012/10/6 Roger Clough



http://www.friesian.com/kant.htm


Kant's "Copernican Revolution"

" Kant's most original contribution to philosophy is his "Copernican
Revolution,"
that, as he puts it, it is the representation that makes the object
possible
rather than the object that makes the representation possible. This
introduced
the human mind as an active originator of experience rather than just a
passive
recipient of perception. Something like this now seems obvious: the mind
could
be a tabula rasa, a "blank tablet," no more than a bathtub full of
silicon chips
could be a digital computer. Perceptual input must be processed, i.e.
recognized,
or it would just be noise -- "less even than a dream" or "nothing to us,"
as Kant
alternatively puts it. "
.

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/6/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Craig Weinberg
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-05, 10:42:30
Subject: Re: A "grand hypothesis" about order, life, and consciousness




On Friday, October 5, 2012 7:05:06 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:


So it is reasonable to define life as that which can produce order
out of chaos" *. Since at least higher living beings
also possess consciousness, my "grand" hypothesis is that

life = consciousness = awareness = producing order out of chaos.


I agree Roger. I would add to this understanding however, a logarithmic
sense of increasing quality of experience.

human experience = consciousness > animal experience = awareness >
microbiotic experience = sensation > inorganic experience = persistence of
functions and structures.

I would not say producing order out of chaos because I think that chaos is not primordial. Nonsense is a mismatch or attenuation of sense, not the
other way around. Order cannot be produced from chaos unless chaos
implicitly contains the potential for order...which makes the production of
orderly appearance really just a formality.

Craig

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