On 16 Oct 2012, at 14:29, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense.
That is a form of idealism.
It pre"suppose sense, so I find it very poor as I am interested in
understanding sense (and matter).
Withc omp we pressuppose only numbers and +, and *, and define
computation in that theory, then the coupling consciousness+material-
realities emerges naturally in a testable manner.
If you could have computation without sense, then there would be no
consciousness.
Assuming that we are infinite, with an infinity not recoverable by the
first person indeterminacy.
Bruno
Craig
On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 7:50:17 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex
computations ?
The short answer is that I am proposing that :
1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position
that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity.
2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make
such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the
range of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted upward-
directed
calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed
platonic reason,
the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know
enough
mathematics to be more specific.
If you would like a more complete discussion, read below.
=======================================================
A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER:
Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an "emergent
property"
of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions:
A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for
Penrose's condition of non-computability ?
http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html
"Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent
property of classical
computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks.
The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that
1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states,
2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex
temporally bind information,
and
3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational
complexity among neurons."
B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ?
Now my understanding of "emergent properties" is that they appear or
emerge through looking at a phenomenon
at a lower degree of magnification "from above. " Thus sociology is
an emergent property of
the behavior of many minds.
IMHO "from above" means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiser
position.
Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia:
http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html
One is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability,
presumably that of Platonia as experienced.
All art and insight comes from such an experience.
On the other hand, if I am not mistaken, Penrose seems to believe
that the universe is made up of
quantum "spin networks", which presumably can model even the most
complex entities.
He does not seem to deny that the "non-computational" calculations
belong to the realm
of spin networks.
This casts some doubt on his belief in the possibility of non-
computability,
and may even allow his spin networks, which are presumably complete,
to escape intact from Godel's incompleteness limitation.
Instead, I propose the following:
1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position
that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity.
2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make
such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the
range of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted upward-
directed
calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed
platonic reason,
the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know
enough
mathematics to be more specific.
=================================================================
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
10/16/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
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