On 29 Oct 2012, at 18:21, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
Some more quotes from From Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of
Perspective by Bas C Van Fraassen.
p. 45 "Agreed, we cannot demonstrate that in principle, as a matter
of logic, mathematical modeling must inevitably be a distortion of
what is modeled, although models actually constructed cannot have
perfection reachable in principle. But on the other hand, the
conviction that perfect modeling is possible in principle - what
Paul Teller calls the "perfect model model" - does not have an a
priori justification either!"
That depends on the assumption we can make. Comp allows perfect
"model", as it makes the mind into an entity mathematically associated
to perfect mathematical notion, like computation (thanks to Church
thesis).
p. 83 "Suppose now that science gives us a model which putatively
represents the world in full detail. Suppose even we believe that
this is so.
With comp it is so, for the realm. But it is a nonsense to use it to
represent "the world" in full detail, at least not effectively. The
expression "world in full detail" is very ambiguous.
Suppose we regard ourselves as knowing that it is so.
This is just impossible.
Then still, before we can go on to use that model, to make
predictions and build bridges, we must locate ourselves with respect
to that model. So apparently we need to have something in addition
to what science has given us here. The extra is the self-ascription
of location."
The taking into account of the first person view. yes, that is
important, but it might not be an extra. In comp it is a given.
p. 83 "Have we now landed in a dilemma for our view of science as
paradigmatically objective? If we say that the self-ascription is a
simple, objective statement of fact, then science is inevitably
doomed to be objectively incomplete. If instead we say it is
something irreducibly subjective, then we have also admitted a limit
to objectivity, we have let subjectivity into science."
Given that with comp both epistemology and physics are "objectively"
*subjective* (first person plural) construct (coherent person dreams),
that is hardly astonishing. Van Fraassen seems just discovering a part
of the difficulty of physicalism, by becoming aware of the importance
of the points of view of the creature described by the theory. With
comp it should be quickly clear that subjectivity is important, even
in the "making" of the physical laws.
Bruno
Evgenii
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