On 30.10.2012 11:26 Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 29 Oct 2012, at 18:21, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
Some more quotes from From Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of
Perspective by Bas C Van Fraassen.
p. 45 "Agreed, we cannot demonstrate that in principle, as a matter
of logic, mathematical modeling must inevitably be a distortion of
what is modeled, although models actually constructed cannot have
perfection reachable in principle. But on the other hand, the
conviction that perfect modeling is possible in principle - what
Paul Teller calls the "perfect model model" - does not have an a
priori justification either!"
That depends on the assumption we can make. Comp allows perfect
"model", as it makes the mind into an entity mathematically
associated to perfect mathematical notion, like computation (thanks
to Church thesis).
I am afraid that you talk about another sort of a model. Van Fraassen
starts from a human being and he considers (also historically) how
scientific modeling is working.
Provided you assume comp, you still have to explain how science is
working in a human society. I am not sure if I understand how comp could
help at this point.
You talk for example about integers as a framework for everything. Fine.
Yet, I would like to understand how mankind through it development has
invented integers. How comp would help to answer this?
Evgenii
Evgenii
p. 83 "Suppose now that science gives us a model which putatively
represents the world in full detail. Suppose even we believe that
this is so.
With comp it is so, for the realm. But it is a nonsense to use it to
represent "the world" in full detail, at least not effectively. The
expression "world in full detail" is very ambiguous.
Suppose we regard ourselves as knowing that it is so.
This is just impossible.
Then still, before we can go on to use that model, to make
predictions and build bridges, we must locate ourselves with
respect to that model. So apparently we need to have something in
addition to what science has given us here. The extra is the
self-ascription of location."
The taking into account of the first person view. yes, that is
important, but it might not be an extra. In comp it is a given.
p. 83 "Have we now landed in a dilemma for our view of science as
paradigmatically objective? If we say that the self-ascription is a
simple, objective statement of fact, then science is inevitably
doomed to be objectively incomplete. If instead we say it is
something irreducibly subjective, then we have also admitted a
limit to objectivity, we have let subjectivity into science."
Given that with comp both epistemology and physics are "objectively"
*subjective* (first person plural) construct (coherent person
dreams), that is hardly astonishing. Van Fraassen seems just
discovering a part of the difficulty of physicalism, by becoming
aware of the importance of the points of view of the creature
described by the theory. With comp it should be quickly clear that
subjectivity is important, even in the "making" of the physical
laws.
Bruno
Evgenii -- http://blog.rudnyi.ru/tag/bas-c-van-fraassen
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