Hi Telmo Menezes Garbage in, garbage out.
----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Telmo Menezes Receiver: everything-list Time: 2013-02-04, 17:19:36 Subject: Re: Again, why the triad is necessary--> 1p, 2p,and 3p as types of knowledge Hi Roger, 1p/3p is a label for a very specific idea. You might disagree with the idea, and that's fine, but it's useful to label ideas so that we know what we're talking about. Otherwise how can you tell us that you disagree with it? If you succeed in forcing 2p in there, you effectively end up with two labels for one idea and zero labels for another idea. Do you see the problem? Best, Telmo. On Mon, Feb 4, 2013 at 8:32 PM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal ? No, Firstness is raw experience (1p), prior to description (3p). In Leibniz, at least, the only true perceiver is God or the One, both beyond the supreme monad. This 1p is not yet knowledge, just nerve signals. Active viewing. ? So only God or the One as active viewer is 1p, and what he returns back to the person would be personal knowledge or a description of the experience (2p or Secondness) which becomes Thirdness or?3p?nly when shared with others (expressed in words as knowledge by description). While in the intermediate step, it is Secondness or 2p, that is, personal knowledge by acquiantance ??or experience. ? So I would place Firstness and 1p in Platonia. And I believe that?2p or knowledge by experience or acquaintance, and being wordlessly personal is in Platonia. ? To summarize,?hen, according to L, ? 1p is actually raw experience, the experience of the One as seen thriough an individual's aspect. ? 2p is what the Supreme monad returns to the individual, as personal or phenomenal knowedge, ??knowledge by acquaintance. ? 3p is 2p turned into or expressed as words or descriptions (3p) to be expressed to others if this is done. ? ? ? ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2013-02-03, 11:35:50 Subject: Re: Why Peirce's triad is more complete than 1p->3p On 01 Feb 2013, at 18:44, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal ? Good. And I should have said, rather than "I cannot prove that", instead, ?"i don't need to prove that any more than that, as an infant, ?n fact? trusted my mother." ? The error is never in the perception (Firstness) , for that is what you actually perceive or feel, the error is always in Secondness, what you make of it. Or as a lie or deliberate distortion in Thirdness, thta being what you tell others you have seen or felt. Your firstness, if it concerns perception is given in 3p, with comp, by Bp & Dt & p. It is the 5th hypostases. I will stick on the most common use of first person and third person. But as you see we can peobably make sense of Peirce in the comp theory. ? So Firstness is always true because it contains no words. ??Always true means I think Platonia. The first person has a link with platonia (truth), but is not platonia.? Secondness can contain an error. Your secondness is already 3p. Contingency. Thirdness can be a lie. Lie are the proposition of the type Bf, or BBf, etc. But with comp (and the classical theory of knowledge, so are "dreams", "error" and "death", curiously enough. ? Which may help to explain why I believe Peirce's triad to be necessary if you want completeness. No problem. Machines might follow Peirce's intuition. But with different vocabulary. Bruno ? ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2013-02-01, 10:38:04 Subject: Re: Is there an aether ? On 30 Jan 2013, at 11:55, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal ? Theology is an objective,?erivative. human?ursuit based on reason, and reason, acccording to my Lutheran beliefs, being objective (3p), cannot be free of error. OK. Only the consciousness root of our subjectivity is undoubtable and cannot been made wrong. The objective is what is doubtable, and indeed science progresses by refuting the objective theories. Only faith (1p), being doubly subjective (guided by the HS), cannot be free of error. OK. But not all the subjective. On some point the subjective can be wrong too. Obviously I cannot prove that.? Comp can prove that for all ideally correct machines, there are true but non expressible fact. And also that there are true, expressible, but non justifiable facts. Machine's subjectivity is very rich and variate. Bruno ? ? ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2013-01-27, 06:56:38 Subject: Re: Is there an aether ? Hi Roger, On 25 Jan 2013, at 15:42, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal ? Separated, yes. But accesible to all IMHO. But then why separate them? Why not allowing seriousness in theology. To ease our fear of death? That's the local goal, and it makes sense locally, but it leads to more problems, especially if everyone can access it: no need of authoritative argument. The bible is a venerable human text, but like all prose, it does not need literal interpretation, or we get insane, and let fight between big-enders and small-enders (cf Voltaire). Bruno ? ? ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2013-01-24, 15:07:59 Subject: Re: Is there an aether ? On 24 Jan 2013, at 09:48, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal and all-- ? Rather than living in such a dreary scientific world, yhe point is to escape from the world of science into the world of Mind. Those worlds are not necessarily separated. Bruno ? ? ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2013-01-23, 11:07:09 Subject: Re: Is there an aether ? On 22 Jan 2013, at 22:52, John Mikes wrote: Richard: and what is ?- ?OT ?- an illusion? are you? or me?? we have no way to ascertain existence and qualia, we just THINK.? Our science is based on SOME info we don't know exactly, not even if it is like we think it is. We calculate in our human logic (stupidity would be more accurate) and then comes a newer enlightenment and we change it all. Brent wrote a nice list of such changes lately. I use the classic Flat Earth.? But we live happily ever after and before (not knowing if TIME does indeed exist?). And some of us get Nobel prizes. Congrats.? So: happy illusions!? Science is only that. The courage to be stupid, and the hope that this might help to be a little bit less stupid tomorrow. But being wrong is, in fact, not really like being stupid. The real stupidity is what persists. It is staying wrong despite evidences. This happens often when people try to measure/judge intelligence and stupidity, especially their own, which makes no sense. We can evaluate special competence, but we can't evaluate intelligence. Bruno John Mikes On Tue, Jan 22, 2013 at 4:20 PM, Richard Ruquist <yann...@gmail.com> wrote: On Tue, Jan 22, 2013 at 3:54 PM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > On Tuesday, January 22, 2013 3:49:09 PM UTC-5, yanniru wrote: >> >> On Tue, Jan 22, 2013 at 3:38 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> > That doesn't have anything to do with your straw man of my position. I >> > have >> > never once said that existence is contingent upon human consciousness. I >> > state again and again that it is experience itself - the capacity for >> > sensory-motor participation which is the progenitor of all possible >> > forms of >> > 'existence'. Something 'being' means that there is an experience, >> > otherwise >> > there is no possibility of anything ever coming into being. >> >> However, in a static Block MWI Universe there is no need for time or >> consciousness or experience. > > > Then in what sense does it 'exist'? It must be an illusion. Either that or MWI is an illusion. Doesn't Bruno say that matter is a dream or illusion? Richard > >> >> That seems to be Bruno's multiverse. >> Although I wonder if his 1p perspective is equivalent to your >> motor-sensory experience in order to make time,& consciousness >> necessary? >> Richard > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/REVm4C8jHA8J. > > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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