On 08 Feb 2013, at 18:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Friday, February 8, 2013 12:02:57 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Feb 2013, at 19:43, meekerdb wrote:
> On 2/7/2013 8:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>>> Beyond our view of matter, I would guess that both of them would
>>> agree that matter is a function of quantum functions, which to me
>>> is the same thing as an image of the mind made impersonal.
>>
>> But that is not what people means by quantum, which need to refer
>> to the *assumed* (not derived like in comp) physics.
>
> Comp is derived from an assumption. Physics is derived from
> observation.
Comp is the assumption.
Physics is partially derived from observation, but makes many
assumptions, inclduing comp most of the time, and it becomes pseudo-
science when it hides the assumption (like when forgetting to relate
the assumption about the existence of a (primary) physical universe.
Then both comp laws and physical laws rely on observation to be
refuted.
Observing, assuming, refuting are all aspects of sense.
Observing? Yes.
But not assuming and refuting which admits sharable 3p independent of
sense, or any notion of truth.
Sense cannot be refuted or assumed or observed without using sense.
Sense cannot be refuted.
It is what makes it uninteresting as a tool in science, even if it is
what makes it the most interesting in life.
Sense cannot be understood as a logical expectation from comp or an
observable mechanism in physics, and in fact both physics and comp
owe their epistemology to sense.
That statements is theory dependent.
Bruno
Craig
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Dennett made clear that he is physicalist, naturalist, and weak
>>> materialist.
>>>
>>> I don't know any scientist being idealist, and even in philosophy
>>> of mind, most dictionaries describe it as being abandoned.
>>>
>>> I agree in the sense that you intend, but I think that
>>> functionalism is the same thing as impersonal idealism.
>>
>> You can't provide new meaning to terms having standard definition.
>
> That's pretty funny from a guy who redefines "God", "theology", and
> "mechanism". :-)
I use the original and general definition of God by those who created
the subject, as I use "theology" in the general sense used by even
contemporaries philosophers. And the use of mechanism for digital
mechanism is the standard term, for example used by Judson Webb,
Dennett & Hofstadter, etc. Then what I derived might astonished those
who have prejudices in the field, but we hardly change a definition
due to logical consequences of them.
Why does atheists defends so much the over-precision brought by the
Romans in the subject can only confirm my (perhaps shocking for some)
statement that atheism is but a variant of christianism, except that
atheists are far more dogmatic on the definitions.
I recommend you stringly the reading of Brian Hines: "Return to the
One: Plotinus' guide to God-realization", which illustrates well the
big similarities between Christian metaphysics and the great
differences too. It illustrates well the complete similarities on the
question and the notions, and the complete difference in the answers.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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