On 28 Sep 2013, at 16:58, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Sep 28, 2013 at 3:16 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
> Everett mention what you call "feeling of identity", which is a
consequence of modeling the observer by a machine
It doesn't matter if "modeling the observer by a machine" is valid
or not, if tomorrow somebody remembers being Bruno Marchal today
then Bruno Marchal has a future,
That's my point. So in the WM duplication, the experiencer has a
future. In fact, he has two futures, and their are logically
incompatible, *from The 1-pov* point of view. As he knows in advance
that he will feel, whoever he is, live only one (again, from The 1-pov).
if not then Bruno Marchal has no future, and Quantum Mechanics or a
understanding of Everett's Many Worlds is not needed for any of it.
It is the other way round.
Period. However in a completely different unrelated matter, if you
want to assign a probability that tomorrow Bruno Marchal will
observe a electron move left or right then you will need Quantum
Mechanics, and some (including me) feel that Everett's
interpretation is a convenient way to think about it, although there
are other ways.
I use Everett QM to illustrate a more general phenomenon, which
applies in the classical setting of machine's calssical duplication.
> With comp [...]
Does "comp" mean every event must have a cause?
No. And "cause" is a complex high level notion. Then with comp every
event has a reason, but not necessarily a "physical cause". That is an
open problem.
That question has a simple yes or no answer,
Or "Open problem". But irrelevant for the FPI.
and you made up the word so you must know the answer, what is it? If
it's yes then I don't believe in this thing you call "comp".
It is "irrelevant open problem".
> in all cases we have one future, in the first person pov
It is revealing that in explaining the theory of personal identity
Bruno Marchal must always insert vague undefined personal pronouns
like "we" or "you" or "I" at key points despite the fact that if it
were already clear what those pronouns referred to then the entire
matter would already be settled.
I give a simple definition of the 1-I and 3-I, in the UDA context (and
anoher definition in the AUDA, based on the Dx = "xx" method used to
define self-reference in computer science. You are the one describing
this as pee-pee stuf when I make this precise, and then you don't take
the definition into account. I don't see the rationality here.
Thus regardless of what "comp" means it is certain that if Everett
is correct then Bruno Marchal has more than one future;
In God' eyes, or in the 3p view, but the 1p-view remains unique. You
will not *feel* being in M and W, and the question is about what you
(in Helsinki) can expect to feel. In all case, he will feel to be a
unique person having been selected for one future relatively to who he
remembers to be (the guy in Helsinki).
You just continue to ignore the 1p and 3p distinction.
Bruno
as to the question "does "he" have more than one future?", well,
that has the same answer as the question "how long is a piece of
string?". But no doubt I am confusing the first person view of the
second person view of the third person view with the second person
view of the first person view of the third person view once removed
on my mother's side.
By the way, exactly when does this "first person pov" occur in a
given experiment and how long does it last? If it's what I'm feeling
right now then it's not going to last for long because "right now"
doesn't last for long.
John K Clark
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