On 28 Sep 2013, at 09:44, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Sep 28, 2013 at 09:29:17AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 28 Sep 2013, at 07:46, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Sep 28, 2013 at 04:33:15AM +0000, chris peck wrote:
Hi Russel
Thank goodness Clarcky has the same/similar complaint as me. I
think Brent does too, because he said he had an initial reaction
to the step like this and then offered an analysis of the
probabilities to me all of which were certainties rather than
indeterminacies. He didn't get back to me on that, but I think
he has doubts or should have.
If that is not what you said, what do you think that man would
experience?
a) Nothing
b) being in Moscow xor being in Washington
c) being in Moscow and Washington
d) being in neither Moscow nor Washington
Logically, these four possibilities exhaust the situation. Only
b) is
compatible with COMP.
You have to remember that the question is asked before the man
is duplicated and consequently only c is compatible with comp. I
hope Bruno's ideas are not too dependent on b being compatible
with comp, because b is incompatible.
If the scan of the man successfully copies the 'I'ness, then
that 'I'ness must be sent to washington AND moscow. And, given
comp, prior to duplication he should expect to experience both
moscow and washington.
All the best.
Experiencing both Washington and Moscow at the same time would be a
sort of madness, a schizophrenic experience. That is why I said it
did
violence to the notion of surviving the duplication. With b) on the
other hand, it matters not whether you experience Washington, or you
experience Moscow, you have survived the experience. That is why
b) is
compatible.
I suppose in retrospect, strictly speaking, d) is also compatible
with
COMP, but a bit of a strange choice. One wonders what you possibly
could be
experiencing in this case, given the protocol.
I don't see how d) can be compatible with comp. Both sees one city,
W or M. Only "b" is compatible, like you said.
Bruno
You survive the experience, but it is not the experience you
expect. Maybe you end up dreaming that you are on Mars, for example.
Its an odd choice, as I said, but I can't see how the COMP postulates
rule it out.
By the default hypothesis that your brain has been copied at the right
level, in the you Helsinki-state, and that it is that state which is
copied in the cities. Dreaming that you are in mars cannot be
instantiated in the copies, nor more than for *any* experimental
procedure. You can also track the Higgs boson with the LARC, and end
up dreaming on pink elephants, but the probability of this is throw
out by the usual default hypothesizing.
Bruno
--
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Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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