On 28 Sep 2013, at 06:33, chris peck wrote:
Hi Russel
Thank goodness Clarcky has the same/similar complaint as me. I think
Brent does too, because he said he had an initial reaction to the
step like this and then offered an analysis of the probabilities to
me all of which were certainties rather than indeterminacies. He
didn't get back to me on that, but I think he has doubts or should
have.
>>If that is not what you said, what do you think that man would
experience?
a) Nothing
b) being in Moscow xor being in Washington
c) being in Moscow and Washington
d) being in neither Moscow nor Washington
Logically, these four possibilities exhaust the situation. Only b) is
compatible with COMP.
You have to remember that the question is asked before the man is
duplicated and consequently only c is compatible with comp. I hope
Bruno's ideas are not too dependent on b being compatible with comp,
because b is incompatible.
If the scan of the man successfully copies the 'I'ness, then that
'I'ness must be sent to washington AND moscow. And, given comp,
prior to duplication he should expect to experience both moscow and
washington.
But do you see that none of the copy will experience both cities? Both
will experience only one city, and by comp, they know this in advance.
Russell is talking on the first person experience, not on the third
person bodies.
Bruno
All the best.
> From: stath...@gmail.com
> Date: Sat, 28 Sep 2013 14:02:44 +1000
> Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>
> On 28 September 2013 05:54, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 11:37 PM, LizR <lizj...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> >> > Anyone who has a problem with Bruno's teleportation thought
experiment
> >> > should logically have the same problem with the MWI.
> >
> >
> > No, you are entirely incorrect. The Many World's Interpretation
is about
> > what you can expect to see, and although it may seem strange to
us Everett's
> > ideas are 100% logically self consistent. Bruno's "proof" is
about a feeling
> > of identity, about who you can expect to be; but you do not
think you're the
> > same person you were yesterday because yesterday you made a
prediction about
> > today that turned out to be correct, you think you are the same
person you
> > were yesterday for one reason and one reason only, you remember
being Liz
> > yesterday. It's a good thing too because I make incorrect
predictions all
> > the time and when I do I don't feel that I've entered oblivion,
instead I
> > feel like I am the same person I was before because I can
remember being the
> > guy who made that prediction that turned out to be wrong.
> >
> > Bruno thinks you can trace personal identity from the present to
the future,
> > but that is like pushing on a string. You can only pull a string
and you can
> > only trace identity from the past to the present. A feeling of
self has
> > nothing to do with predictions, successful ones or otherwise,
and in fact
> > you might not even have a future, but you certainly have a past.
>
> Teleportation thought experiments are also about what you can
expect to see.
>
> If you toss a coin and teleport to either Washington or Moscow
that is
> like a single world interpretationof QM.
>
> If teleport to both Washington and Moscow that is like the MWI.
>
> It is generally accepted that you can't tell which is the case from
> experience. If you think they are different then you would have a
> proof or disproof of the MWI. Is that what you claim?
>
>
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
>
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