On 29 Sep 2013, at 12:19, chris peck wrote:
Hi Bruno, and thanks for the reply.
>> Precisely: the expectation evaluation is asked to the person in
Helsinki, before the duplication is done, and it concerns where the
person asked will feel to be, from his first person point of view.
-------------------------------------------------------
Yes, but in the responses Ive had from yourself and others the
situation has been addressed from the situation after Helsinki. So
far at least.
?
You might quote mùe, but I make clear and insist, at each step of the
UDA, that the question is addressed before the duplication. After, it
would not have any meaning (like "what is the probability to get Head
after the coin has been throwned").
The confirmation or refutation of the prediction is asked after. So
the guy which predicted "W and M" is refuted by its own seeing (After,
both will see only one city, and the question was about that seeing,
and not the body localization).
-------------------------------------------------------
>>
If one of the 'me's is asked after teleportation but before the
doors are opened what are the chances of being in moscow, then I can
see that there is indeterminacy.
OK. So you can derive the First Person Indeterminacy (FIP) from the
Delayed Uncertainty Principle: If I can predict with certainty
(modulo default hypothesis) that tomorrow I will feel to be
uncertain about some outcome of some experience, then I am already
uncertain now about that outcome.
Not sure about that Bruno. I know that if I believe I have been
duplicated and end up at the terminal of some teleport system
without knowing which terminal I'm at then the probabilities change
from the situation before teleportation. At that point I believe I
will be duplicated and genuinely end up at both terminals.
That entails there are probabilities! Indeed.
There is one me befoe the duplication, and two me's after, from the
or a third person point of view.
But, assuming comp, there is always only one "me", from the first
person points of view. In Helsinki, you can predict with certainty
that you will write in your diary that you are specifically in only
one precise city, and the umber of first-person-me has not changed,
it is still one. From that view, you inherit a doppelganger in the
other city, but it is another "first-person" entity, even if
intellectually ( or from a third person view) you can consider that
it is a "you".
If I am sufficiently described by the reading process to maintain
'I'ness then this 'I'ness goes to washington and moscow.
That is a third person view on the first person view. You are right.
But the question in Helsinki concerned the first person view on the
first person view.
-------------------------------------------------------
I think I'm beginning to see where your confusion comes from.
It might not help you to betray that you are searching a confusion, as
this betrays you want the result to be false, before understanding.
But OK. let us see.
Strictly speaking one can not have a first person view on a first
person view.
On the contrary, it is very simple. After the duplication you can say
I am in both place, so in both place there are two 1-views, as I do
attribute consciousness to my doppelganger. This is a third person
view, but which attribute 1-view to both people. I have introduced
this only to refute Clark idea that this fact shows there is no
indeterminacy, and this lead by analogy to distinguish it from the
genuine 1-view on oneself. of course you are right, the 1-view on the
1-view is an 1-view.
The viewing is 1 - p and whatever is viewed, however hard you try to
fool yourself that it is also a 1 - p view is, in fact, 3 - p. It is
the object of viewing.
Which is inferred, and of course not viewed (I might be dreaming, or
deluded, etc.).
The object of the 1 - p.
That is ambiguous.
I can imagine my self viewing Moscow or Washington,
?
I can predict that I will view W or M, but you cannot view "M v W", or
that can mean too many things.
perhaps as a 1st person camera perspective a la Blair Witch Project
- i can even split screen it so that I can imagine a simultaneous
Washington and Moscow view. But in fact here the 1 -p is the
imagining not the 'viewing Moscow or viewing Washington'.
Keep in mind that here 1p is defined by the content of the personal
diary or memory. The reasoning works by given a (simple) 3p definition
of the 1p.
Consequently, there is nothing really to suggest that I have
'intellectualized' the process anymore than you have. And in fact,
at this point in your informal 'proof' you suggest people should
attempt to 'feel' rather than think the point through. Alarm bells
start ringing whenever philosophers appeal to 'feels' over thought.
You do not present an argument for why feels should be given
precedence and of course it is an open question as to what a comp
practitioner would feel anyway.
"Feel" just emphasizes that the probability has to bear on the 1p. You
can use "write in his personal diary that he took with him in
Helsinki" instead. It is not philosophy, and the protocol are
completely clear. By assuming comp we know in advance that after the
duplication, the guy will feel (or write in his diary) "I feel to be
in W", or "I feel to be in M".
It is an extraordinarily tenuous 'slight of hand' at the crux of
your informal proof.
I hope you see better now.
Of course, one person can only have one 1-p view. That states the
obvious. However, If I am one person about to be duplicated and if I
believe in comp (and beliefs are paradigmatically 1-p phenomena)
Knowledge is typically 1p, but belief are sharable and more typically
3p. This does not paly any role here, but is used in the arithmetical
(and constructive) version of the UDA. We can come back on this (much)
later.
then ISTM I will also believe that my identity carries over to two
places.
That is correct. You can say, already in Helsinki: "you can join me by
phone at W and at M". But you know that you will get the 1p experience
of (feel) the phone call only in one place, even if the correspondent
give a phone call to M and to W.
OK?
It is a very simple idea. I am not sure what you are missing.
This will not be an intellectualized think through, it will be a
second nature 'feel'.
We assume comp, and the question bear on the "direct feeling". In W
you cannot even be sure that the reconstitution has been done in the
other city. You will need third person evidences. So, unless you
introduce some (non-comp) telepathy between the two reconstitution,
you will get the point that the "direct feeling" (to use your term)
was not predictable.
Otherwise, I do not genuinely accept comp. And Im afraid I do not
think you do accept comp.
I do not philosophy. My acceptance or not of comp is private. The
point is only that IF comp is true THEN there is that first person
indeterminacy in self-multiplication.
Just to turn the screw a little tighter, I believe my description of
what our practitioner about to be teleported would think and feel is
far closer to a 1-p description of the feels and thoughts a comp
accepter would have. That is precisely the point. I am trying to
describe how a comp practitioner would feel. You on the other hand,
despite proclaiming the opposite, in fact go to great lengths to
intellectualize the situation. You fail to 'get into the head' of a
comp practitioner prior to duplication.
?
of course, comp is used to reason (which is mainly 3p). So I certainly
intellectuallized, but comp just gives the way to "intellectualize"
about the first person subjective points of view.
I fail to see if you have grasped the 1p-indeterminacy. You certainly
failed to provide a flaw, in case you think there is one. may be you
can elaborate. be sure to grasp what we mean by the 1p, and if you
think you can determine it in advance, explain how. It is much simpler
than you thought. A child recently saw by himself that even God cannot
predict to you (in Helsinki) the outcome felt after such duplication.
Arguably, this FPI is also used implicitly in Everett QM.
Best,
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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