On 25 Oct 2013, at 23:33, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:
Citeren meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>:
On 10/25/2013 9:08 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 5:00 PM, Quentin Anciaux
<allco...@gmail.com <mailto:allco...@gmail.com>> wrote:
> Be consistent, reject MWI, or ask *the same question* about
the probability of
*you* (who is you ? pinocchio maybe ?)
In the MWI John Clark doesn't have to worry about who "you" is
because however many copies of "you" there may or may not be they
will never meet and John Clark will never see more than one copy
of Quentin Anciaux. But in Bruno's thought experiment that is no
longer true, so to continue to blithely babble on about "you"
causes nothing but confusion.
I don't see why that is determinative. Suppose the M-man never
meets the W-man and in fact neither of them even knows whether the
other one exists?
> measuring spin up while measuring the spin of an electron
And probability implies prediction and prediction has nothing to
do with a sense of self, and that is what Bruno's "proof" is all
about. If when you pressed the button you were 99% certain, in
fact even if you were 100% certain and there was not the tiniest
particle of doubt in your mind that you would end up in
Washington, and one second later you found yourself in Moscow your
sense of self would not be diminished one iota, you'd just figure
that you made a bad prediction, and it wouldn't be for the first
time.
Sure, and if the experiment were repeated N times then most of the
2^N participants would find, consulting their diaries, that they
were right about half the time and wrong the half - and, even after
comparing notes with one another, they would decide that Bernoulli
trials are a good model of what happens when being teleported via
Bruno's duplicator.
> Your agenda is not to try to comprehend something, it is just
to bash someone with
no reason except misplaced pride.
Ask yourself this question, why aren't Bruno's ideas universally
recognized by the scientific community as a work of genius? There
are 2 possibilities:
1) Due to the same misplaced pride that I have the entire
scientific community is jealous of Bruno and would rather destroy
a stunning new advancement in human knowledge than admit they
didn't find it first.
2) The entire scientific community has run into the exact same
logical stumbling block in Bruno's ideas that I did.
Or they consider this particular idea, uncertainty via duplication,
to be a commonplace and uncontroversial. Most people (including
me) find the last two steps of Bruno's argument more suspect in
which he argues that all possible computation is the fundamental
basis of the material world.
Brent
It is:
3) Bruno has yet to develop the mathematical tools to do practical
computations.
Not at all. That would be the case if the goal was doing physics, but
the goal was only to formulate the mind body problem.
Then, despite this, the math part (AUDA, the machine's interview) does
provide the mathematical tools to do practical computations. The
arithmetical quantization is fully given and has been compared with
quantum logic.
That we are at light years from getting anything like the standard
model is not really relevant, as the standard model does not address
the mind-body problem.
A physicist can complain that comp is a long way to be able to use as
physics, but I insist: the goal is to show that the mind-body problem
is not solved, and that with comp, we have to derive physics from
arithmetic, and I got already the propositional part of physics.
The subject is the mind-body problem, not physics per se.
Technically, the problem is that physicists don't know mathematical
logic (as Penrose illustrated to the logicians). Very few physicists
understand the X1* and Z1* logic, which gives the needed arithmetical
quantizations.
That's another problem: only logicians knows logic. They have no
problem with AUDA. But many just dislike the mind-body problem and
applications of logic. My work reminds that logic per se does not
solve philosophical problem, which annoy them as they are still under
the spell of Vienna positivism, where logic is used to replace
metaphysics, and comp shows that this is not enough.
I think.
Bruno
Suppose that you could derive the Standard Model from deeper
principles, then it doesn't matter what the philosophical objections
against these principles are.
No one cares that Einstein's arguments leading to Special Relativity
were not rigorous. Obviously, you can't derive special relativity
rigorously from electrodynamics, because relativity is more
fundamental than electrodynamics. At best you can present heuristic
arguments. Some philosophers do make a problem out of that, but in
physics no one really cares. Most modern textbooks do this correctly
by discussing Lorentz invariance and only then deriving the Maxwell
equations as the correct generalization of Coulomb's law.
Saibal
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
