On 07 Dec 2013, at 18:17, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sat, Dec 7, 2013 at 3:13 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 06 Dec 2013, at 20:35, Jason Resch wrote:
On Fri, Dec 6, 2013 at 4:10 AM, LizR <lizj...@gmail.com> wrote:
On 6 December 2013 21:52, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 05 Dec 2013, at 20:05, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Dec 5, 2013 at 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 05 Dec 2013, at 17:20, Jason Resch wrote:
So if you were to spend a day in the box with Schrodinger's cat
(each hour having a 50% chance of poisoning you), what would you
predict experience to be at the end of that day?
I like to answer this by this: At the end of the day I feel well
and kiss the cat, together with a total amnesia of having gazed,
which begin by a nausea, vomiting, cruel pain and agonizing death.
I would put quantum flowers on 'his' quantum tomb to have died for
me. Respect for the little kitty too.
I don't see this. Surely you are far more likely to have
experienced the nausea and pain, and to have nevertheless survived
somehow - by a very unlikely chance - than to have lucked out and
not been gassed at all?
This is the problem with QTI - it seems to me almost inevitable
that one will only survive in a very unfortunate state, at least
for a long time.
Yes, if QTI, or Computational Immortality are true, then the only
way to explain them, given we are not infinitely old, is that we
are in a state of amnesia concerning our true history of experiences.
In a sense, below our substitution level, we should be indeed old,
because the FPI get maximal, on all computations going through your
current state, and almost all computations are arbitrarily long.
That's why it is still possible that comp implies an infinite age
for the physical reality.
But conscious beings can hop from "physical reality" to "physical
reality", depending on where the continuations exists, can't they?
Hopefully. Apparently, most of the time.
Just as a computer emulation of a conscious being may not run
forever, it can still temporarily instantiate them, and when that
computer stops, it does not end the consciousness as it "hops" to
another computer somewhere else which keeps on going.
Well, he would feel to be selected if he could have an idea of the
huge number of different computations on which it can indeed hop. But
the hoping is "blind" and indeterminate, under the substitution level,
as opposed to the bet on the local universal "number" (DNA, heavy
bodies, you, the colleagues, etc.) above.
(just taking comp seriously. Not that anything above is true)
Bruno
Jason
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