On 12 Dec 2013, at 22:45, Jason Resch wrote:
Any time John Clark pretends that he does not understand or believe
in first-person indeterminancy, refer him to his own post where he
admitts to understanding it and believing in it:
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/5PR1FXp_CSU/PnuTSn_82PwJ
John Clark: "So yes, subjectively the intelligence would have no way
of knowing if A was true or B, or to put it another way subjectively
it would make no difference."
Note: In case A the inputs to the mind are controlled by a random
number generator and in case B, the mind is duplicated and shown
different results. So by accepting there is no subjective
difference, John Clark accepts that true randomness is subjectively
indistinguishable from duplication and bifurcation. In other words,
John Clark knows that duplication and bifurcation can yield the
appearance of randomness.
Yes. the problem is that he then consider this "not original", and by
a curious use of logic, that seems enough for him to not look at the
importance of the fact, and to proceed at the next step.
I think John is too much aware that the FPI is original, after all,
and he does not one to concede the logical point for unknown personal
agenda (let us say). It looks like he is aware that if he accept step
3, he will be forced to accept the other steps, and conclude that comp
implies "comp" (in his wording).
It is obvious that John Clark has seen the point, but use bad
philosophy and rhetorical tricks to hide his understanding and to
avoid to proceed.
Too bad for him. It is sad, but there is nothing we can do,
apparently. It is not that we are not trying, though.
Bruno
Jason
On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 3:27 PM, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com>
wrote:
On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 6:45 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
> In Everett it's always obvious who I'm talking about when I use
the personal pronoun "you", it's the only other fellow in the room
with me; but in Bruno's thought experiment there is a man standing
to the right of the duplicating machine and a identical looking man
standing to the left of the duplicating machine and they both have a
equal right to use the grand title "you".
> But they know pretty well who they are in the first person way,
No they do not, not in a world with duplicating machines; and by
insisting that they do you're assuming the most important part of
the very thing you're trying to prove. Mr. You doesn't know if he's
the copy or the original. Mr. You doesn't know if he's 40 years old
or 40 seconds old. Mr. You does know that he's the guy who is having
this thought right now, but in a worjd of duplicating machines that
is insufficient information to make a differentiation because that
fellow over there (or is it a mirror) could be having the exact same
thought at the exact same time.
> One told me: I see in my diary that I predicted (in Helsinki) that
I would be at both places, but I see now that this was wrong
I predicted? In such a situation that would only be a half truth, it
would be much more accurate to say the Helsinki man predicted or
Bruno Marchal predicted. A pronoun has raised its ugly head yet again.
>>> Then you can't say that you will survive anything. We die at
each instant
>> OK, but then you can't say that survival is important, or that
the word means much of anything at all.
> That was my point. Indeed. Comp would lost his meaning.
At last we agree on something, "comp" has lost it's meaning.
>> 'Comp" is not trivial, "comp" is a gibberish word made up by you
that is almost as meaningless as "free will".
> Comp is the mechanist thesis. You confuse axioms and theorems.
It's the erroneous theorems that you claim to have derived from the
sound axioms of computationalism that I object to. And that's the
difference between "comp" and "computationalism", and that is why
you insist on using your homemade silly little word rather than the
standard term.
> your preceding argument was shown to confuse the 1-view and the 3-
view
For several years now Bruno Marchal has accused John Clark of that,
but John Clark would maintain that there is not a single person on
the face of the earth who is confused by the difference between the
first person and the third person.
>> why do you keep emphasizing what the various copies will predict
about their future and how accurate those predictions turn out to be?
> The point is that we need only a notion of first person self
I think therefore I am.
> and thrid person self
I know what a third person is, but what the hell is the "third
person self"?
>> I honestly don't give a damn about "comp"
> You said that you believe in comp.
I NEVER said I believe in "comp", I don't even know what your
homemade word means, you claim it's just short for
"computationalism" but that is clearly untrue. For years I've tried
to infer its meaning from your usage but have been unsuccessful.
> If you think there is no 1-indeterminacy
I don't think that either! It's not exactly a earthshaking
discovery to state that we often don't know what we will see next, I
believe that was first found by Og the caveman. So everything you
say is true or original, the parts that are true are not original
and the parts that are original are not true.
John K Clark
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