On 06 Feb 2014, at 20:54, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, February 6, 2014 11:22:24 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Feb 2014, at 20:29, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, February 5, 2014 12:53:56 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 05 Feb 2014, at 13:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, February 5, 2014 4:37:39 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 04 Feb 2014, at 18:07, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Numbers can be derived from sensible physics
That is a claim often done, but nobody has ever succeed without
assuming Turing universality (and thus the numbers) in their
description of physics.
Turing universality can just be a property of physics, like
density or mass.
That is close to just nonsense (but I agree that some notorious
physicists are attracted to this, but they don't convince me).
Can you explain why?
Because Turing universality is a mathematical notion.
It has nothing to do with physics. But physics can implement them,
and that notion is not that obvious.
How do you know it has nothing to do with physics?
Because the paper convinced me, and this by assuming the most
elementary mathematic. No reference at all to anything physical is
mentioned. Turing's model *looks like* a sort of physical device, but
that's only part of Turing's pedagogy. Turing machine are mathematical
objects, and they can be defined in arithmetic.
Certainly it seems more plausible to me that Turing universality
supervenes on a common language of physical unity and unit-plurality
than it does that the flavor of a tangerine supervenes on Turing
universality.
Then you are like explaining the simple things that we agree on by the
complex things nobody agree on.
Just as Comp does a brute appropriation of qualia under 1p
uncertainty,
No. That would be a confusion between []p and []p & p (or others).
Only God can do that confusion.
You seem to go back and forth between making qualia something
transcendent and private, to making it somehow inevitable
mathematically.
Yes. But it is not a back and forth. It just happen that when
machine looks inward, and "stay honest" with herself, she cannot
avoid some private transcendence. It is a theorem of arithmetic,
with standard definition for transcendence.
What's a standard definition for transcendence?
I said *some* private transcendence, because to be honest on this
needs, if only the completion of the course in modal logic, and much
more.
But the main idea of transcendence is that it looks real or true, yet
you cannot justify it, or prove it to another.
typical "human" candidate is consciousness, sense (I guess), the
belief in a primitive physical universe, or in God, but also different
kinds of relations that machines can have with different kind of
infinities.
How do you know that such a condition is not a 1 dimensional data
transformation rather than an introspective aesthetic environment?
As far as I can make sense of this, I would say that once a machine
looks inward, she is confronted to an introspective aesthetic
environment.
If we ask ourselves, 'Does being a good mathematician require you
to be a good artist or musician?', the answer I think is no.
I am not sure. But "good mathematician" is vague. "Good artist" also.
Just in simple, straightforward terms - does being able to multiply
fractions require that you can paint a realistic face or does it
seem to be a fundamentally different talent?
It depends who you are.
If we ask 'Does being a good artist or musician require us to be a
good mathematician?' the answer is also no. Why is the relation
between math, physics, and science so obvious,
Such relation are not obvious. That is why we discuss them. Indeed
comp changes them radically.
Comp would change them if it were correct.
That's the point.
I am using the fact of their colloquial relation as support for Comp
being misguided.
I do not support comp.
On the contrary, I try to measure how much incredible it is, but up to
now, QM might remains still a little bit more incredible.
but the relation between any of those and the arts is not so obvious?
because to add numbers you need few bytes. To pain Mona Lisa, you
nee much more bytes, and richer 1p experiences.
It doesn't follow though that more math would equal 'unlike math'
Of course. that is why we assume comp. Which is reasonable, if only
because there is no evidence for non comp.
- at least not without a theory of why math would become unlike
itself and what that would mean.
But that's exactly what I offer to you!
physics can do a brute appropriation of arithmetic under material
topology.
Some material disposition can be shown to be Turing universal. But
this is proved in showing how such system can implement a universal
machine (quantum or not quantum one).
Don't you just have to go to a level of description where the
material appears granular. I don't really get the argument that all
matter is computable but not all computation can be materialized.
Comp implies that matter is not computable. "materialization" is an
emergent phenomenon on coherence conditions on infinite sum of
computations.
Why wouldn't you still be able to materialize any infinite sum of
computations?
I was just saying that comp does not entail that all physical
observable are computable, and indeed at least one of them has to be
non computable (by the FPI).
It would explain why Turing universality does not apply to gases
It applies to gases. technically no usable, as it is hard to put
all the gaz molecules
Not talking about gas molecules, I'm talking about a volume of
ideal gas.
at the right position at the right time, but in principle, gases,
in some volume, are Turing universal system.
You would need to control that volume with non-gaseous containers
and valves. Gas is still not Turing universal as an uncontained
ideal gas. Computation requires formal, object-like units...because
arithmetic is not really universal, it is only low level.
and empty space.
Hmm... Quantum vacuum is Turing universal. I think.
I'm talking about an ideal vacuum though, not the vacuum that we
imagine is full of particle-waves or probability juice. If I'm
right about the sense primitive, energy exists only within matter,
and not in space.
For classical physics, you need at least three bodies.
Computers require object-like properties to control and measure
digitally.
Yes.
You often say, "we can do that", but this makes sense only if you
do it actually.
Some people might say that it is being done:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YDCwrbqHfTM
The Future of Computing -- Reuniting Bits and Atoms
I hope you are not serious. Interesting but non relevant.
This worries me when you give a blanket denial with no explanation.
Why is it not serious? If we can make computer language out of
stuff, then why would it not follow that computation is an emergent
property of stuff?
Then you need to change the definition of computation". I use it in
its standard sense, the one notion discovered by Babbage, Church,
Post, Turing, and Markov.
What would the definition of computation have to change to? They are
calling what I'm talking about embodied computation - but it still
delivers the same result.
Not really, because "embodied" is a physicalist terminology (by
default) for implementing (in the math sense) a universal machine (in
the math sense) in this or that subpart of the physical reality (which
is indeed at least Turing complete).
The Future of Computing -- Reuniting Bits and Atoms
as easily as physics can be derived from sensible numbers.
Physics is not yet extracted, only the or some quantum
tautologies, and that was not that much easy, at least for me ...
But the principle of the possibility is not difficult, at least,
not for anyone who has ever programmed a player-missile graphic/
avatar/collision detection in a game.
On the contrary. Hmm... I see you have not yet grasped the main UDA
points.
I don't see the connection to UDA. I'm talking about the common
sense understanding in which programmed rules can be metaphorically
rendered to resemble physics.
That is not extracting physics from the statistical interference of
all computations. That is the metaphorical use of comp, which is out
of my topic.
It's not metaphorical use of comp, it's the idea of the Matrix/
simulation. Code comes in, and physics appears to appear inside.
OK. But the real physics is not in one matrix, it has to come for the
infinity of "matrices", and the 1p machines perception appears through
a limit process (a UD* fact reflected by the semantic of the []* logic).
Even if the physicist find a dimple equation or program emulating
the physical universe, to extract both the quanta and the qualia,
we have to derive physics explicitly from ... sense. That is why
sense if fundamental.
That's what I'm saying. If you want to reduce everything to
physics, you need quanta + public facing sense. If you want to
reduce everything to information, you need quanta + private sense.
Well, using 1p information, which is not "information" in the
Shannon sense, nor the quantum sense.
I think we can conceive of both Shannon information and non-
information in 1p.
Sure.
If you want to reduce sense, you can't do it, but you can reduce
quanta/information to sense as public facing sense - private sense.
We agree on this: physics must be derived from sense. this is
explained both in UDA, and exploited in AUDA. But we start from
comp, not non-comp.
I'm saying that physics is derived from sense, and so is comp.
At some level, yes. But that's trivial. At the conceptual level,
everything is more easily derived from "simple" things that everybody
can understand and write on a ticket, like
Kxy = x
Sxyz = xz(yz)
Comp explains why that is enough, and more makes it redundant or
inconsistent, for the ontology, now, each combinators or numbers can
think what it wants.
Sense both comp, non-comp, and the capacity to discern the two.
But to derive physics from first person sense is not easy at all,
and to understand this you have first to understand how sense is
derived from arithmetic.
Sure it's not easy, because you have to invent a shadow of sense
that can be described in arithmetic, and then make yourself forget
that it is only a description of some logical/modal consequences of
sense.
No, I study and listen to the machine. The modal things are
mathematical tools simplifying the use of the machine's talk and
experience (at least in the S4 classical sense that we get with the
theaetetus' idea).
I don't think that you have given me any reason why I should accept
that a machine has experience.
Because there is nothing preoccupying less than this task.
I intervene only to say that your argument against comp is not valid.
Keep in mind that with comp, physics does not involve one
particular computation, but all computations at once.
I would hope so.
May be one day you will love comp!
Maybe, but not for the reasons I have heard so far.
Well, you can hate comp too, given it shows that your non-comp theory
is the natural first sight impression by the machines, and that they
are correct from the 1p view, on this, and that only God can know
which machine we might be.
You have a quite good phenomenology, but y trying to make it into a
"theory" or "system", you do the error of Goethe and Bergson. They
were good, but they did misapply their critics on some domain of
science, which, btw, is not immune to that type of error too, note).
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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