On 07 Feb 2014, at 20:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Friday, February 7, 2014 12:33:07 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Feb 2014, at 20:54, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, February 6, 2014 11:22:24 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Feb 2014, at 20:29, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, February 5, 2014 12:53:56 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 05 Feb 2014, at 13:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, February 5, 2014 4:37:39 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 04 Feb 2014, at 18:07, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Numbers can be derived from sensible physics
That is a claim often done, but nobody has ever succeed without
assuming Turing universality (and thus the numbers) in their
description of physics.
Turing universality can just be a property of physics, like
density or mass.
That is close to just nonsense (but I agree that some notorious
physicists are attracted to this, but they don't convince me).
Can you explain why?
Because Turing universality is a mathematical notion.
It has nothing to do with physics. But physics can implement them,
and that notion is not that obvious.
How do you know it has nothing to do with physics?
Because the paper convinced me, and this by assuming the most
elementary mathematic. No reference at all to anything physical is
mentioned. Turing's model *looks like* a sort of physical device,
but that's only part of Turing's pedagogy. Turing machine are
mathematical objects, and they can be defined in arithmetic.
That's great for you but it may as well be "The Bible showed me the
light" to me. Nothing physical is mentioned, but that does not mean
that the concepts could have arisen in the first place without the
presence of physical objects as inspiration. I understand completely
that a Turing machine is an abstraction, but the principles which
are beneath that abstraction require that theoretical features
behave in particular ways. The Turing machine needs to be
constructed of reliable, emotionless, untiring, undistractable, semi-
permanent units. There can be no fluid or imaginative components, no
free intentions or personal preferences. The Turing machine is a
structure sculpted of hyper-earth, not fire, water, air, or ether.
Proof?
Certainly it seems more plausible to me that Turing universality
supervenes on a common language of physical unity and unit-
plurality than it does that the flavor of a tangerine supervenes on
Turing universality.
Then you are like explaining the simple things that we agree on by
the complex things nobody agree on.
I don't agree that the flavor of a tangerine is complex or that
nobody agrees on it. It seems much more complicated to try to reduce
that flavor to what could only be the processing of hundreds of
billions of bytes.
?
Just as Comp does a brute appropriation of qualia under 1p
uncertainty,
No. That would be a confusion between []p and []p & p (or others).
Only God can do that confusion.
You seem to go back and forth between making qualia something
transcendent and private, to making it somehow inevitable
mathematically.
Yes. But it is not a back and forth. It just happen that when
machine looks inward, and "stay honest" with herself, she cannot
avoid some private transcendence. It is a theorem of arithmetic,
with standard definition for transcendence.
What's a standard definition for transcendence?
I said *some* private transcendence, because to be honest on this
needs, if only the completion of the course in modal logic, and much
more.
But the main idea of transcendence is that it looks real or true,
yet you cannot justify it, or prove it to another.
typical "human" candidate is consciousness, sense (I guess), the
belief in a primitive physical universe, or in God, but also
different kinds of relations that machines can have with different
kind of infinities.
Why isn't it just subconscious?
You can call it like you want.
How do you know that such a condition is not a 1 dimensional data
transformation rather than an introspective aesthetic environment?
As far as I can make sense of this, I would say that once a machine
looks inward, she is confronted to an introspective aesthetic
environment.
So you don't know,
?
but you are gong to say that it is the one and not the other.
I said that you might have both (in comp).
If we ask ourselves, 'Does being a good mathematician require you
to be a good artist or musician?', the answer I think is no.
I am not sure. But "good mathematician" is vague. "Good artist" also.
Just in simple, straightforward terms - does being able to multiply
fractions require that you can paint a realistic face or does it
seem to be a fundamentally different talent?
It depends who you are.
I don't think that it depend on anything. Art galleries are full of
art, not mathematical proofs. In a universe of pure math, there
would be no need for art.
That is just trivially false in comp (you need only the UDA for that).
Then it is less trivially false in AUDA, but still easy to show false
if you know Solovay theorem, to name just one.
All this has already be done and verified.
If we ask 'Does being a good artist or musician require us to be a
good mathematician?' the answer is also no. Why is the relation
between math, physics, and science so obvious,
Such relation are not obvious. That is why we discuss them. Indeed
comp changes them radically.
Comp would change them if it were correct.
That's the point.
I am using the fact of their colloquial relation as support for
Comp being misguided.
I do not support comp.
On the contrary, I try to measure how much incredible it is, but up
to now, QM might remains still a little bit more incredible.
Then the relation between math, physics, and art may not be changed
by comp, since comp may not be credible.
Not credible? Proof?
but the relation between any of those and the arts is not so
obvious?
because to add numbers you need few bytes. To pain Mona Lisa, you
nee much more bytes, and richer 1p experiences.
It doesn't follow though that more math would equal 'unlike math'
Of course. that is why we assume comp. Which is reasonable, if only
because there is no evidence for non comp.
The existence of art is evidence for non comp.
Why?
- at least not without a theory of why math would become unlike
itself and what that would mean.
But that's exactly what I offer to you!
I don't see the theory.
Read the papers.
I only see assurances that there is a theory which makes sense to you.
It is given by, and make sense for many people, and in fact for all
machines, if you accept standard definition in the field (like
knowledge obeys S4).
physics can do a brute appropriation of arithmetic under material
topology.
Some material disposition can be shown to be Turing universal. But
this is proved in showing how such system can implement a
universal machine (quantum or not quantum one).
Don't you just have to go to a level of description where the
material appears granular. I don't really get the argument that
all matter is computable but not all computation can be
materialized.
Comp implies that matter is not computable. "materialization" is an
emergent phenomenon on coherence conditions on infinite sum of
computations.
Why wouldn't you still be able to materialize any infinite sum of
computations?
I was just saying that comp does not entail that all physical
observable are computable, and indeed at least one of them has to be
non computable (by the FPI).
If physical observation supervenes on consciousness, and
consciousness supervenes on computation, then how could we observe
anything which is not computable?
We can't observe that, but deduce it from comp.
Then you need to change the definition of computation". I use it in
its standard sense, the one notion discovered by Babbage, Church,
Post, Turing, and Markov.
What would the definition of computation have to change to? They
are calling what I'm talking about embodied computation - but it
still delivers the same result.
Not really, because "embodied" is a physicalist terminology (by
default) for implementing (in the math sense) a universal machine
(in the math sense) in this or that subpart of the physical reality
(which is indeed at least Turing complete).
It's not a physicalist terminology, it's that they are using
physical stuff as the literal units of the programming language.
What else should they call it?
No problem to use "embodied", once we have clear in mind the reversal.
Before that it is more neutral to use "implementation relatively to a
universal system or number".
The Future of Computing -- Reuniting Bits and Atoms
as easily as physics can be derived from sensible numbers.
Physics is not yet extracted, only the or some quantum
tautologies, and that was not that much easy, at least for me ...
But the principle of the possibility is not difficult, at least,
not for anyone who has ever programmed a player-missile graphic/
avatar/collision detection in a game.
On the contrary. Hmm... I see you have not yet grasped the main
UDA points.
I don't see the connection to UDA. I'm talking about the common
sense understanding in which programmed rules can be
metaphorically rendered to resemble physics.
That is not extracting physics from the statistical interference of
all computations. That is the metaphorical use of comp, which is
out of my topic.
It's not metaphorical use of comp, it's the idea of the Matrix/
simulation. Code comes in, and physics appears to appear inside.
OK. But the real physics is not in one matrix, it has to come for
the infinity of "matrices", and the 1p machines perception appears
through a limit process (a UD* fact reflected by the semantic of the
[]* logic).
'
No matter how many matrices or how the limitation logic works, the
overall process is as I described - It from Bit.
Like comp?
If you want to reduce sense, you can't do it, but you can reduce
quanta/information to sense as public facing sense - private sense.
We agree on this: physics must be derived from sense. this is
explained both in UDA, and exploited in AUDA. But we start from
comp, not non-comp.
I'm saying that physics is derived from sense, and so is comp.
At some level, yes. But that's trivial.
fgfgjl;kj...
We've been debating this for hundreds of hours, and now you're
agreeing that I've been right the whole time, but saying its
trivial. My whole point has always been that computationalism is not
valid, since computation is itself a product of a deeper
(primoridial) pansensititivity. If you are saying now that our
*human* consciousness is what you were talking about being filtered
logically through computation from the Absolutely primitive sense,
then I have no problem with that.
I told you many times that I do agree with your phenomenological point
(if only because it match the 1p associated to the machine).
I disagree just with your statement that this refutes comp, when in
fact it confirms it.
No, I study and listen to the machine. The modal things are
mathematical tools simplifying the use of the machine's talk and
experience (at least in the S4 classical sense that we get with the
theaetetus' idea).
I don't think that you have given me any reason why I should accept
that a machine has experience.
Because there is nothing preoccupying less than this task.
I intervene only to say that your argument against comp is not valid.
I say only that your intervention is (unintentionally) biased for
comp, because it presumes that argument drawn from theory deserves
equal consideration with argument drawn from aesthetic acquaintance.
1p is never an argument. You can as well say that comp is false
because God told you so.
Bruno
Keep in mind that with comp, physics does not involve one
particular computation, but all computations at once.
I would hope so.
May be one day you will love comp!
Maybe, but not for the reasons I have heard so far.
Well, you can hate comp too, given it shows that your non-comp
theory is the natural first sight impression by the machines, and
that they are correct from the 1p view, on this, and that only God
can know which machine we might be.
You have a quite good phenomenology, but y trying to make it into a
"theory" or "system", you do the error of Goethe and Bergson. They
were good, but they did misapply their critics on some domain of
science, which, btw, is not immune to that type of error too, note).
Thanks. I have come across some signs that I should check out
Bergson, and Goethe's work with color seems strangely familiar.
Craig
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
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