On Wednesday, March 26, 2014, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> > On 26 Mar 2014, at 01:37, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > > On 26 March 2014 11:29, LizR > <lizj...@gmail.com<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','lizj...@gmail.com');> > > wrote: > >> On 26 March 2014 12:12, Stathis Papaioannou >> <stath...@gmail.com<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','stath...@gmail.com');> >> > wrote: >> >>> >>> An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness >>> flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are >>> immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication >>> between its distant parts. >>> >>> Only if one assumes comp, I think, or something akin to Frank Tipler's >> "Physics of Immortality" view which basically says that identical quantum >> states are good enough to be mapped onto one another, and we experience all >> the states together in an infinite BEC type thing until differentiation >> occurs. (Cosmic, man!) >> > > You don't have to assume comp. If the theory is that consciousness is > secreted by the brain like bile is secreted by the liver, so that a > simulation can't be conscious, there will be other brains in the universe > similar enough to yours that they will have a similar consciousness. > > > Assuming comp! > If y consciousness is really needing the exact material bile in my liver, > the other brain will just not be similar enough, and it is conceivable that > although conscious like me, the copy might be another person. This makes no > sense, if you use some form of comp. > > > > This is a concrete, no nonsense, no consciousness-flitting-about type of > theory - but your consciousness will still effectively flit about because > you can't be sure which copy you are. > > > Assuming comp. If the exact "infinite state" of the bile is required, then > by definition, the other person is a different person. I agree this seems > absurd, but that is a comp prejudice. After all, I *can* conceive that the > other might be an impostor an authentically "other person". > If consciousness is secreted by the brain, then if you make a similar brain you will make a similar consciousness. The actual theory of consciousness doesn't make any difference here. The claim that the copy isn't really the same person is equivalent to, and as absurd as, the claim that I'm not the same person after a night's sleep. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
