On 31 Mar 2014, at 07:41, LizR wrote:
I'm not sure collapse is an observed fact. Collapse is an assumption
which explains how we come to measure discrete values.
On 31 March 2014 16:27, <ghib...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Tuesday, March 25, 2014 3:01:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Mar 2014, at 05:48, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
On Monday, March 24, 2014 4:48:13 AM UTC, chris peck wrote:
The only person in any doubt was you wasn't it Liz?
I found Tegmark's presentation very disappointing. He was
alarmingly apologetic about MWI pleading that its flaws were
mitigated by the fact other interpretations had similar flaws; as
if the fact someone else is ill would make you less ill yourself. I
think in the world of QM interpretations, with bugger all evidence
to decide between them, the game is to even out the playing field
in terms of flaws and then chase parsimony. Ofcourse, whether an
infinite set of worlds is more or less parsimonious than just one
+ a few hidden variables, or one + a spooky wave function
collapse, depends very much on what definition of parsimonious you
find most fitting.
MWI is refuted by the massive totally unexamined - some unrealized
to this day - assumptions built in at the start.
?
MWI seems to me to be the literal understanding of QM (without
collapse).
It is also a simple consequence of computationalism, except we get a
multi-dreams and the question remains open if this defines a
universe, a multiverse, or a multi-multiverses, etc. (results points
toward a multiverse though).
How can 'without collapse' in any sense be literal? Collapse is an
empirically observed fact.
That is what I thought. I thought for some time (many years ago) that
computationalism was false, because it implies MW, in some testable
way if we look below our substitution level, but when reading QM
textbook, I was struck by the collapse, and I thought this was an
empiric facts. But I didn't find serious paper showing this, and got
the "QM light" when discovering Everett. From this I became rather
persuaded that QM confirms the comp proliferation of realities, up to
the existence of the arithmetical measure problem.
Some experience with partial superposition (sometimes called
schroedinger kitten) have been proposed as evidence for a collapse,
but they are as much evidence of the MWI. An *apparent* collapse, can
be as well considered as an apparent universe differentiation.
OK...you see an elegant explanation sBould the empirically observed
fact actually not be.
But would even that alone have been remotely near the ballpark of
things taken seriously, had there not been extreme quantum
strangeness irreconcilable at that time, with the most core, most
fundamental accomplishments of science to date?
MWI evacuates all weirdness from QM. It restores fully
- determinacy
- locality
- physical realism
The price is not that big, as nature is used to multiplied things,
like the water molecules in the ocean, the stars in the sky, the
galaxies, etc.
Each time, the humans are shocked by this, and Gordiano Bruno get
burned for saying that stars are other suns, and that they might have
planets, with other living being.
It is humbling, but not coneptually new, especially for a
computationalist, which explains the MW from simple arithmetic, where
you need only to believe in the consequence of addition and
multiplication of integers.
MWI is an extreme explanation that makes the universe infinity more
complex and undiscoverable than it was before.
On the contrary. The *whole universe* becomes conceptually much
simpler. The mono-universe is more complex, as it needs the same
explanation accompanied by a selection principle contradicting the
simple laws.
An intolerably extreme theory unprecedented in all science, to be
taken seriously, requires an even more intolerable crisis. And it
just so happens at that very same point, such an extremity
confronted science...quantum strangeness.
But hold on a mo...I said MWI blasted complexity to the infinite
limit. But that isn't true is it? MWI is Occam consistent, so the
complexity malarkey is refuted good and proper. I will gladly stand
corrected on that then.
Ah! OK.
But you would agree, wouldn't you, that were it not for that Occam
argument MWI would be placed in an untenlaable position?
I am not sure. Not only there are no evidence for a collapse, but
there is no clear definition of what it would be. The SWE is
incompatible with the collapse. If the collapse is true, QM is false.
That's why Bohr insists that QM is false for the macro-reality. But,
since then, QM has been confirmed at all scales, and is used in the
foundation of cosmology, etc.
Glad you can agree about that. You should all really be able to
agree about the hard-linking of MWI and quantumht strangeness.
There's no reason why believing MW should obscure this fact.
And.....that Occam argument. What is that based on again, without
which it wouldn't be viable. Yes that's right, it's quantum
strangeness. None of the other stuff factors in much at all.
We use Occam all the time in science. Without Occam, there is no
reason to believe the earth is round, nor that it go around the sun.
-
Hundreds....possibly uncountably so...of largely unrealized,
unexamined, assumptions are fundamental in MWI construction from Q
Zero assumption is needed. The MW is just QM taken literally. If I
decide to drink a cup of coffee or of tea according to the result of a
measurement of spin on a particle prepared in the state 1/sqrt(2)[up +
down], I can only end up in the state 1/sqrt(2)[drinking-coffee +
drinking-tea]. If one term disappear, QM is just false on the couple
(me + the cup + the electron). But nobody is able to make a coherent
theory about that disparition.
An there is nothing paradoxical in my state 1/sqrt(2)[drinking-coffee
+ drinking-tea], given that the linearity of QM, + comp, explains
easily why the version of me
drinking coffee has become independent of the version of me drinking
tea.
I have pointed this out in the past. People typically try to rebut
this basically the same way you try here, involving denying MWI is
intrinsically linked to quantum strangeness in multiple, massive
ways. I've listed some above. Each one of the examples above,
demonstrate a way MWI would never have happened, or would be
rendered untenable, where it not for some defence founded
exclusively on quantum strangeness.
For physicists this is natural. But here you talk to someone who
believed in the many-world or many-dreams *before* realizing the
strangeness of QM. QM+collapse is not just unclear, but it contradicts
comp, not just the SWE.
At ther times I've shown how it is impossible to render MWI without
implicitly making several assumptions about local realism, as to its
objective truth AS WE PERCEIVE IT, it's priority in relation to
other conceptions on scales of what is fundamental, and so on.
It's just shocking - it used to be disturbing also - how none of
you are willing to acknowledge the defining linkage of MWI and
quantum strangeness. Despite massive evidence through multi[le
dimensions from me. Despite obviousness. Despite complete failure to
date of any one of you to refute any one of the of the hard
linkages (I.e. MWI would not exist or would be thrown out without
that link) that I've given.
it is shocking for the aristotelians, who are used to believe only in
what they see. It is not shocking for the platonists, who are used to
believe that what they see is only a tiny pat of what is.
Despite the fact nothing new is ever said...the same arguments just
get repeated. Despite all of them, I think, totally demolished and
refuated by a quantum strangeness dependency.
Comp illustrates the contrary, but even without comp, it is natural to
accept a shocking but conceptually clean idea (the mutliverse) instead
of quasi-inconsistent ideas like 3p indeterminacy (that Einstein
called insanity), 3p non locality (that Einstein called telepathy, or
spooky) or physical realism, without wich science becomes instrumental
and abandon the goal to put light on the nature or reality.
Like Bruno's repeat below of this argument QM is a direct
consequence of these things and nothing else.
Local realism is not part of QM assumption. It is a direct
consequence of the linearity of the Schroedinger Equation, and the
linearity of the tensor products.
h
Yeah? So you think that because some equations have a linearity
character - which may be important, may be puzzling. But because of
this, you say, thiis feature alone is enough to deny the reality of
what is consistently the empirically observed collapse of the wave
function.
You can give me references, but I doubt you will find any. Everett
explained very well (by comp) why we cannot "feel" of "observe" the
split.
To such an extreme priority this denial of objective fact be true,
science would be willing to construct an infinite multiverse around
the denial ofje empirically observed obective reality, just so as to
make it work?
You confuse 1-views and 3-views. Galilee was also mocked when saying
that the earth go around the sun, or turn on itself, and that the move
of the sun is only apparent. For most people, the move of the sun was
a clear empirical facts, until they did the math. It is the same for
the QM MW.
You honestly believe that? Is there precedence for something like
this? No. It'blacks Bruno. There's nothing about those equations
that categorically rules out collapse events. Ciolapse eents are not
even shown lower in priority. The equations in that model recur. So
what
l
You have no case for MWle the result of these sequences as you
claim. You have no realistic, plausible case.
Yet you keep repeating it. And it's pretty clear why..what is in
your head. What is true, is that MWI conceivably does follow to some
high level extHoent from these equations and a range of assumptions
then made.
I have just no understanding at all for QM+collapse. I bought, when
young the idea that the collapse was due to the conscious act of
observation, but eventually realized it leads to solipsism. You can
look at Shimony's reflection on this:
SHIMONY A., 1963, Role of the Observer in Quantum Theory, Am. J. of
Physics 31, 6, pp. 755-773
SHIMONY A., 1989, Conceptual Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, in The
New Physics, Paul Davies (Ed), Cambridge University Press.
But that's neither here nnor there Bruno. Evolution can be derived
in all sorts of ways. New ways of deriving things parre always
emerging. But that is not the difficult part of this. Would that
derivation alone have been sufficient for the extremes of MWI to
become a serious contender?
Like I explained above, "extreme" is subjective. MW is for me far more
simple and natural, even without any QM.
Science is littered with equations that imply or fail to imply
science. Newton's a magical action at a distance. Newton knew it was
a problem, but it was a profound far reaching of hundreds of
solutions. For one new problem. A good deal. Science was willing to
leave that problem right at the core of his theory for more than 300
years.
How much do you want to bet I can't come up with a multiverse
explanation that clears up Newtons non-local problem?
GR solves this. No need of QM. Well, eventually we need to marry GR
and QM, to get the whole picture, and this we still don't have.
ca
You ha ve not made your case. You have not seen the problem with how
you try to make a case. You keep repeating this refuted, frankly
daft argument. Yes...you can envisage MWI from an issue with thosoe
equations. Big deal. Show that thei lineaity of those equations
alone is enough, to drop empirical observation and invent a
multiverse just to make the denial stand up. Show it. Show a
precedent. Make an explicit argument thaet acknowledgess the
challenge and its importance
e d
With comp, the theory is even simpler, as it is only the following
axioms (+ classical logic, and classical definition of knowledge):
0 ≠ (x + 1)
((x + 1) = (y + 1)) -> x = y
x + 0 = x
x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1
x * 0 = 0
x * (y + 1) = (x * y) + x
There are no other assumptions, as I hope to make that clear in the
math thread. (No assumptions beyond comp at the meta-level to justify
that indeed we the theory above is sufficient and necessary, up to
some Turing equivalence).
With comp, you can put it in this way: there are 0 physical universes.
It is a "nothing theory". It explains yet the appearance of a
multiverse and the appearance of quantum laws "seen" from "inside" the
arithmetical reality, for purely logic-arithmetical reasons.
And my point is not that this is true, but that this is testable (and
partially tested).
Comp and Everett might be refuted some day. But I would bet that this
is not because they are shocking, more because they might not been
shocking enough. Platonism prepares better to the counter-intuitive
than Aristotelianism.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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