On Monday, March 31, 2014 8:30:35 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 31 Mar 2014, at 07:41, LizR wrote: > > I'm not sure collapse is an observed fact. Collapse is an assumption which > explains how we come to measure discrete values. > > > On 31 March 2014 16:27, <ghi...@gmail.com <javascript:>> wrote: > >> >> On Tuesday, March 25, 2014 3:01:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> >>> On 25 Mar 2014, at 05:48, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Monday, March 24, 2014 4:48:13 AM UTC, chris peck wrote: >>>> >>>> The only person in any doubt was you wasn't it Liz? >>>> >>>> I found Tegmark's presentation very disappointing. He was alarmingly >>>> apologetic about MWI pleading that its flaws were mitigated by the fact >>>> other interpretations had similar flaws; as if the fact someone else is >>>> ill >>>> would make you less ill yourself. I think in the world of QM >>>> interpretations, with bugger all evidence to decide between them, the game >>>> is to even out the playing field in terms of flaws and then chase >>>> parsimony. Ofcourse, whether an infinite set of worlds is more or less >>>> parsimonious than just one + a few hidden variables, or one + a spooky >>>> wave function collapse, depends very much on what definition of >>>> parsimonious you find most fitting. >>>> >>> >>> MWI is refuted by the massive totally unexamined - some unrealized to >>> this day - assumptions built in at the start. >>> >>> >>> ? >>> >>> >>> MWI seems to me to be the literal understanding of QM (without collapse). >>> It is also a simple consequence of computationalism, except we get a >>> multi-dreams and the question remains open if this defines a universe, a >>> multiverse, or a multi-multiverses, etc. (results points toward a >>> multiverse though). >>> >> >> How can 'without collapse' in any sense be literal? Collapse is >> an empirically observed fact. >> > > > That is what I thought. I thought for some time (many years ago) that > computationalism was false, because i implies MW, in some testable way if > we look below our substitution level, but when reading QM textbook, I was > struck by the collapse, and I thought this was an empiric facts. But I > didn't find serious paper showing this, and got the "QM light" when > discovering Everett. From this I became rather persuaded that QM confirms > the comp proliferation of realities, up to the existence of the > arithmetical measure problem. > Some experience with partial superposition (sometimes called schroedinger > kitten) have been proposed a. s evidence for a collapse, but they are as > much evidence of the MWI. An *apparent* collapse, can be as well considered > as an apparent universe differentiation > This isn't like the structure of my thought on the matter. Intense immersion is thfeature of yours, in what all appear to be your hallmark box of horrors :o) Yet the position of many years ago you relate, appears nearer full inversion of what you believe now than back. And that's a little bit fascinating because there may be a suggestion what you actually believe and what you corresponding immerse yourself in, and at what intensity, is decoupled, as least currently anyway. Or you kind of just made some of that up, which if so, might serve the purpose in your eyes of helping me to discover myself - the things you suspect I am tacitly assuming but don't know thato I am, Well there's a thought. And with allowances duly made for that, another explanation would be along the lines of....... ....it really doesn't take a dogmatic empiricism for an overwhelming operational bias favouring what we observe as what happens over what we observe I as what does not happen. Try reeling everything back to the first days of QM, and adjust the picture a little so as to remove the element of quantum strangeness from the historical record completely. It never happened there was quantum strangeness. You obviously need to cook the books a little so that everything is just the same, as if quantum strangeness was real. Except in this world it's not. Real. OK, so in that imaginery world, run me by our impressions the first time we observe wave function collapse.. (ilremember, it only exists in this world, when it suits us so we can look at the ways MWI could still come about without strangeness .
> > > > > > > > OK...you see an elegant explanation sBould the empirically observed >> fact actually not be. >> >> But would even that alone have been remotely near the ballpark of things >> taken seriously, had there not been extreme quantum strangeness >> irreconcilable at that time, with the most core, most >> fundamental accomplishments of science to date? >> > > MWI evacuates all weirdness from QM. It restores fully > - determinacy > - locality > - physical realism > That's the claim. But you don't seem to regard this as an important characteristic of MWI. I can what you mean Bruno. You are in a context of the minimum postulates, and then consequences, to derive a theory. Like MWI. That's fair enough. But that's a level of definition - an important one. That may also stand in as the typoical proxy for a full definition. , But, for example, theories solve problems. Theories realize goals. Theories plug explanatory gaps. Theories, generalize, or simplify. Theories perform WORK. For example (which I mentioned) can you explain how it woul d be possible to make an assessment of the Occam consistency of a theory, without knowing what was changed / different describing how MWI improves the picture, arguing MWI is not Occam falsified, MWI is better than other interpretions, what events aend problems/crises rdominated the lead up to the first suggestions of MWI, and so on, and so on, What I'm saying Bruno, is every single one of those examples is 100% dependent on quantum strangeness. And these are legitimate elementhts of theory structure, which also happen to monopolize everything to do with how a theory came about, what the drivers where, how a eory made a case for itself, how a theory made a case for iteoself in Occam, how a theory got preffered over another, and so on. ot What you are saying in reply is something like "Well, I'm going to ignore all of those dimensions, and wheel out this derivation I've got here, of MW I derived from linearity of the equations., And if there's no strangeness in THIS definition there's no connection between strangeness and mwi I don't think that's a legitimate argument > The price is not that big, as nature is used to multiplied things, like > the water molecules in the ocean, the stars in the sky, the galaxies, etc. > Each time, the humans are shocked by this, and Gordiano Bruno get burned > for saying that stars are other suns, and that they might have planets, > with other living being. > It is humbling, but not coneptually new, especially for a > computationalist, which explains the MW from simple arithmetic, where you > need only to believe in the consequence of addition and multiplication of > integers. > And you think this is legitimate for linked feature of MWI, but absolutely no strangeness? Times like this I wonder > > > > > >> MWI is an extreme explanation that makes the universe infinity more >> complex and undiscoverable than it was before. >> > > > On the contrary. The *whole universe* becomes conceptually much simpler. > The mono-universe is more complex, as it needs the same explanation > accompanied by a selection principle contradicting the simple laws. > None of that goes away Bruno, with MWI. It all just gets puished up, and back as what the multiverse faces. You can probably ignore it, or not think about it, or say 'you lost me' if eone else raises the matter. MWI is a vague theory in that it's impossible to generate a mathemhe matics for the multiverse, nor any predictions, or anticipations for the nature oother the basic - verbal - notions about splitting. So of course, it'srob pretty easy to feel like the challenges of one universe go away. Our theories about this universe are good, so the problems are brought right out. MWI doesn't do anythink remotely like that, so pretty easy to pretend those problems all went away...and that's why mwi is telling us nothing > > > > An intolerably extreme theory unprecedented in all science, to be taken >> seriously, requires an even more intolerable crisis. And it just so happens >> at that very same point, such an extremity confronted science...quantum >> strangeness. >> >> But hold on a mo...I said MWI blasted complexity to the infinite limit. >> But that isn't true is it? MWI is Occam consistent, so the complexity >> malarkey is refuted good and proper. I will gladly stand corrected on that >> then. >> > > Ah! OK. > > > > > But you would agree, wouldn't you, that were it not for that Occam >> argument MWI would be placed in an untenlaable position? >> > > > I am not sure. Not only there are no evidence for a collapse, but there is > no clear definition of what it would be. The SWE is incompatible with the > collapse. If the collapse is true, QM is false. That's why Bohr insists > that QM is false for the macro-reality. But, since then, QM has been > confirmed at all scales, and is used in the foundation of cosmology, etc. > Sorry I just find what is stated here totally dispiriting..depressing actually. What the hell way rouind do you thinsk this works Bruno? you think we treat the phyrisically observable and describable and triggerable, as the tentative theory? And then, do we test it against an equation someone wrote, and if the equation says no, the observed is falsified? Is that how it works you think? sorry can't finish all the replies > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. 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