On 13 Apr 2014, at 19:43, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
If you guys want to argue to infinity these similar points (all
really particular too at both end, of course), than sure: my
apologies. I just took Bruno by his word of "I'll just say if I see
an argument or not." and felt that was better than to have this
thread keep ballooning with nobody else in the discussion or seeming
to follow anymore. But if that was not a genuine point, fine. I
stand corrected. PGC
On the contrary, and I wish I could have read your comment before
answering Craig. I might have avoiding answering it but I have that
sort of weakness in believing he might see some point. It is also hard
to not answer false attribution.
Craig is quite correct compared to the first person associated to the
machine by the []p & p definition, and it reminds me that comp is, and
has to be, counter-intuitive.
It is a mini Brouwer-Hilbert debate, with Brouwer played by Craig, and
the 1p of the machine (S4Grz, []p & p), and Hilbert (me, or the []p of
the machines.
The logical appearance of the person is
Truth -> person -> machine/theories/ideas
or put it differently:
p -----> []p & p -----> []p (& p?)
Craig illustrates well that consciousness is in the true part, not in
the representation, but you need both to have a local particular
person, relatively to some universal number or system.
Now this made him into a trivial step zero stopper, and I can be tired
of the accumulation of word play, and the begging questions.
I appreciate the intervention.
Bruno
On Sun, Apr 13, 2014 at 7:22 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 13 Apr 2014, at 00:46, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Can sense not be allowed to represent itself in your court of
argument?
That is a very good idea.
That is quite close to what happens with the definition by Theatetus
of (rational) knowledge by saying that is a (rational) belief
(finitely 3p describable) which is also true (something not
definable in general, but well known in many situations). That truth
might not be computable (like in self-multiplication), nor definable
(like in Peano Arithmetic or by Löbian machines), and that is why we
use the truth (p) to represent itself, in the definition of know(p)
by []p & p.
That describes a knower (it obeys S4), and explains the existence of
the fixed point, the locus where the beliefs are incorrigible, and
correctly so, from that necessarily existing point of view. It
explains the existence of proposition which will be trivially true
from the first person perspective, yet impossible to communicate
rationally to another machine.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
