On Sun, Apr 13, 2014 at 8:26 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> > On 13 Apr 2014, at 19:43, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: > > If you guys want to argue to infinity these similar points (all really > particular too at both end, of course), than sure: my apologies. I just > took Bruno by his word of "I'll just say if I see an argument or not." and > felt that was better than to have this thread keep ballooning with nobody > else in the discussion or seeming to follow anymore. But if that was not a > genuine point, fine. I stand corrected. PGC > > > On the contrary, and I wish I could have read your comment before > answering Craig. I might have avoiding answering it but I have that sort of > weakness in believing he might see some point. It is also hard to not > answer false attribution. > Ok, it's undecidable whether he ever will see the points or the fallacies. But one can mistake some appearance of progress with fresh syntax of the day. I don't think his position changed or moved one iota in past two years regarding just the possibility of subject/step 0. The latest posts prove this again and again. > > Craig is quite correct compared to the first person associated to the > machine by the []p & p definition, and it reminds me that comp is, and has > to be, counter-intuitive. > > It is a mini Brouwer-Hilbert debate, with Brouwer played by Craig, and the > 1p of the machine (S4Grz, []p & p), and Hilbert (me, or the []p of the > machines. > That is a fine way to see it, but I doubt Brouwer would confuse his own intuitive notions with problems/resolutions to "true generation of consciousness" and concepts of that sort. > > The logical appearance of the person is > > Truth -> person -> machine/theories/ideas > > or put it differently: > > p -----> []p & p -----> []p (& p?) > > Craig illustrates well that consciousness is in the true part, not in the > representation, but you need both to have a local particular person, > relatively to some universal number or system. > He never acknowledged that he lacks a frame in some third person sense, or limits for the primitives to his explanations. So he could continue forever trivially, S4Grzetting you to the end of time with fancy color explosion of syntax/semantics after you state some limit of machine or some flaw in reasoning. > > Now this made him into a trivial step zero stopper, and I can be tired of > the accumulation of word play, and the begging questions. > > I appreciate the intervention. > I see how that it's a tricky question, but I wouldn't be surprised if you just turned around and walked away from these games that are not even that funny; well, except for Craig = Brouwer and you = Hilbert []p (I'm not so sure Brouwer would be ok with Craig; much less Hilbert with you!) kind of stuff. PGC > > Bruno > > > > > > > On Sun, Apr 13, 2014 at 7:22 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> >> On 13 Apr 2014, at 00:46, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> Can sense not be allowed to represent itself in your court of argument? >> >> >> >> That is a very good idea. >> >> That is quite close to what happens with the definition by Theatetus of >> (rational) knowledge by saying that is a (rational) belief (finitely 3p >> describable) which is also true (something not definable in general, but >> well known in many situations). That truth might not be computable (like in >> self-multiplication), nor definable (like in Peano Arithmetic or by Löbian >> machines), and that is why we use the truth (p) to represent itself, in the >> definition of know(p) by []p & p. >> >> That describes a knower (it obeys S4), and explains the existence of the >> fixed point, the locus where the beliefs are incorrigible, and correctly >> so, from that necessarily existing point of view. It explains the >> existence of proposition which will be trivially true from the first person >> perspective, yet impossible to communicate rationally to another machine. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
