On Sunday, April 13, 2014 2:26:21 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > Craig illustrates well that consciousness is in the true part, not in the > representation, but you need both to have a local particular person, > relatively to some universal number or system. >
I agree that a local person needs representation to localize their experience, but that does not mean that universal numbers are not also representations for conditioning the primordial (sensory) presence. Numbers are not creative, they are recursive. Numbers can extend the creativity of an existing substrate to the extent that the substrate is intrinsically creative. Craig > > Now this made him into a trivial step zero stopper, and I can be tired of > the accumulation of word play, and the begging questions. > > I appreciate the intervention. > > Bruno > > > > > > > On Sun, Apr 13, 2014 at 7:22 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be<javascript:> > > wrote: > > > On 13 Apr 2014, at 00:46, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > Can sense not be allowed to represent itself in your court of argument? > > > > That is a very good idea. > > That is quite close to what happens with the definition by Theatetus of > (rational) knowledge by saying that is a (rational) belief (finitely 3p > describable) which is also true (something not definable in general, but > well known in many situations). That truth might not be computable (like in > self-multiplication), nor definable (like in Peano Arithmetic or by Löbian > machines), and that is why we use the truth (p) to represent itself, in the > definition of know(p) by []p & p. > > That describes a knower (it obeys S4), and explains the existence of the > fixed point, the locus where the beliefs are incorrigible, and correctly > so, from that necessarily existing point of view. It explains the > existence of proposition which will be trivially true from the first person > perspective, yet impossible to communicate rationally to another machine. > > Bruno > > > > > > ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
