On Friday, May 16, 2014 3:20:24 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 15 May 2014, at 22:22, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Thursday, May 15, 2014 2:19:01 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 15 May 2014, at 14:40, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 6:34:55 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 14 May 2014, at 03:45, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > I'm showing that authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, and that > the failure of logic to detect the significance of authenticity can be > empirically demonstrated, but that neither authenticity or the failure of > logic to detect it can be detected within logic. At least Godel shows > logic's incompleteness, but that is just the beginning. What logic doesn't > know about what logic doesn't know I think dwarfs all of arithmetic truth. > > > Gödel has shown the completeness of first order logic, and this means that > what we prove in a theory written in such logic, will be true in all > interpretation of the theory, and what is true in all interpretations, will > be provable in the theory. > > Then Gödel proved the incompleteness of *all* theories about numbers and > machines, with respect to a standard notion of truth. > > This means that the truth about number and machines are above what > machines can prove, and thus what human can prove, locally, if we assume > computationalism. > > > But computationalism is a theory about numbers and machines, so we cannot > truthfully assume it. > > > > no. It is a theory about your consciousness, and its relation with > possible brains. >
But a brain is just a type of machine under comp, and the relations are just number relations. > It becomes a theory about numbers, but that is the result of a non trivial > reasoning, and the acceptation of the classical theory of knowledge. > I can't imagine why the classical theory of knowledge should be acceptable as a way to model consciousness. > > > > > Does Wiles solution to Fermat's last theorem prove that humans can use > non-computational methods, in light of the negative solution to Hilbert's > 10th problem? > > > No. > > > Why not? I doubt I'll understand your answer but I might be able to get > someone else to explain why he thinks you're wrong. > > > Well, you can invite him to make his point. > I've only spoken with him a couple times, but I would if it comes up in the future. > The problem is that somehow, in some sense, humans can use non > computational rules, like heuristics and metaheuristic, which are non > algorithm. But that is also a big chapter in AI, and machines can also use > heuristic without problem, and it change nothing about the truth or falsity > of comp. In fact the first person "[]p & p" is also a non algorithmic > entity. So, use à-la Penrose Gödelian argument are usually confusion > between []p and []p & p, or []p in G and []p in G*. > I think that it is nothing other than a semantic misdirection to take non-computational first person properties as being associated with computation. If non-computational properties serve an important function in consciousness, then comp is false. If our first person experience is non-computational then comp is false, since the production of non-computational effects by computation does not imply consciousness, nor does it even imply independence from consciousness to accomplish that production. > > > > > > > > Penrose thinks that it does: > > "The inescapable conclusion seems to be: Mathematicians are not using a > knowably sound calculation procedure in order to ascertain mathematical > truth. We deduce that mathematical understanding – the means whereby > mathematicians arrive at their conclusions with respect to mathematical > truth – cannot be reduced to blind calculation!" > > > Good. That's when Penrose is correct. No machines at all can use a > knowably sound procedure to ascertain a mathematical truth. > By adding "knowably" Penrose corrected an earlier statement. But then he > does not realize that now, his argument is in favor of mechanism, because > it attribute to humans, what computer science already attributes to machine. > > > If computer science attributes it to machines (and I would say that it is > only some computer scientists who do so) > > > because some are not aware of the difference between []p & p and []p. > I am aware that the difference is assumed in comp rather than explained by comp. You admit that at some level, basic functions of logic are taken as axioms. I reject all possibility of axioms in the absence of sense. > > > > > then it cannot use a knowably sound procedure to do that, therefore it is > a belief rather than a correct attribution. > > > Yes. you even need an act of faith. I never defend the "truth" of comp. It > is a belief like everywhere in science when we apply it to a reality. > I don't think that the understanding that awareness is ontologically necessary is an act of faith, I think that it is inescapable empirically and rationally. I would not say that I have faith in that or that I am choosing to believe it, I only say that it makes more sense to me and seems like it should make more sense to others. > > > > > > If we allow mechanism to be true by faith, I don't see how any argument > within mechanism can be used to prove that mechanism cannot be disproved. > > > The point is that mechanism can be disproved. > Only in theories in which mechanistic logic is already accepted as the authoritative standard. I think that the possibility of mechanism being disprovable is a mirage within logic. It is disprovable in theory, but that theory is biased toward mechanism. > > > > > > > > > The arguments against Penrose seem to me pure unscientific bigotry: > > "Theorems of the Gödel and Turing kind are not at odds with the > computationalist vision, but with a kind of grandiose self-confidence that > human thought has some kind of magical quality which resists rational > description. The picture of the human mind sketched by the computationalist > thesis accepts the limitations placed on us by Gödel, and predicts that > human abilities are limited by computational restrictions of the kind that > Penrose and others find so unacceptable." - Geoffrey LaForte > > > Well, if you have evidence that we don't have those limitations, please > give them. > > > That's what I'm giving. I saw someone's exhibit at the consciousness > convention a few weeks ago which included a musical translation of Wiles > proof - a proof which he says would not be possible for a computer to > produce, given the negative answer of Hilbert's 10th problem. > > > Those are not related. > He disagrees, and I'm in luck! I found his paper online. See what you think: http://jamestagg.com/2014/04/26/free-will-universe-paper-text-pdf/ > > > > > Are you able to solve and decide all diophantine equations? > > > I can't, but Wiles proves that humanity as a whole might. > > > But all machines as a whole might as well. No need of magical carbon, a > priori. > Any mention of carbon is a straw man of my view, as I have explained several times. It's starting to seem like convenient forgetting. I use a sense primitive, so tying my view to carbon is like claiming that I think Shakespeare is a product of the Latin alphabet. > > > > > > He seems to be saying "I don't like it when people imagine that being > human can ever be an advantage over being a machine. Machines must be equal > or superior to humans because of the thesis that I like." > > > > Being a machine is an advantage, for reproduction and use of information > redundancies. Instead of terraforming the neighborhoods we can adapt > ourselves in much more ways. We have more clothes, and ultimately we know > where they come from, and where we return. > You're saying that we are identical to machines on one hand but that if we are machines we will be able to be and do things that we could not do now. That says to me that you are 1) intuiting properties of non-machines that are not discoverable by math, and 2) attributing those properties to us because it is natural to assume that humans are not machines. We do it now at the molecular level, but betting on the fact that we are > some machine, at some not to low level, makes us possible to explore the > universe more easily. > We can explore the universe at that level without betting that "we" are completely described by mechanism. Our public view of the universe might be describable that way, but if it is, that might be because the public view is a reduction of the totality of private views, which are much richer than mechanism. > > > > >> >> Universal machine are always unsatisfied, and are born to evolve. There >> is a transfinite of path possible. >> > > But there are a lot of humans who seem quite satisfied. They actively > resist dissatisfaction and protect their beliefs, true or not. > > > Good for them. I guess they don't look inward or are not interested in the > search of truth. > Then either they aren't universal machines, or it doesn't mean anything to say that universal machines are always unsatisfied. Well, even human are used sometimes for their non universal ability. > Then the definition of universal machine explodes, since any claim that you make on behalf of the behavior of universal machines can be negated by an equally unfalsifiable counter-claim that the first claim relates to the non-universal abilities of universal machines. > > > > > > >> >> And Gôdel completeness is what machine discover themselves quickly, they >> can justify it rationally. >> > > Yet some of what they justify is not merely justified within their own > experience or belief, but veridically in intersubjective experience over > many lifetimes. > > > That too, from passing from the arithmetical []p (and []p & <>p) to the > non arithmetical []p & p (and []p & <>p & p), with p sigma_1. > > I almost only translated what you said in arithmetical terms, and it works > very well, as this entials your insitence that sense is not formalizable in > arithmetic. (It also refute your statement that this fact refutes comp). > To me, what you're saying sounds like "I figured out that what you are saying is wrong." but then not explaining it. > I explain it. You makes words to defend the idea that you are not a machine, I don't. I defend the idea that mechanism is incomplete and does not include the fact of aesthetic encounters of sense. and I explain that I am not convince this refute comp, because the machines > already do similar sequence of words. Machines do the opposite also if comp is right and you are a machine. I'm not sure why you think this line of argument is convincing. You can claim that machines say X and that machines say ~X. That does not inspire confidence. You might as well say "Machines are right when they think like me, but they are not as right when they think like you." > That refutes your proof, simply. And indeed you are just showing that you > have a first person notion, and that is indeed not a machine, all machines > know that already. I don't think that machines know anything. No more than a shadow knows the sun. Craig Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
