On 26 June 2014 15:32, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > On 6/25/2014 7:03 PM, LizR wrote: > > On 25 June 2014 16:52, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > >> On 6/24/2014 2:29 AM, LizR wrote: >> >> On 24 June 2014 17:04, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >> >>> >>>> If primitive matter existed, and if it has a role for consciousness, or >>>> for consciousness instantiation, step 8, and the argument above, makes that >>>> role very mysterious, so much that it is not clear why we could still say >>>> yes to the doctor in virtue of correct digital rendering. >>>> >>> >>> You can still say yes to the doctor because he is going to use matter >>> to make your brain prosthesis. >>> >> >> Surely that will just be a copy that thinks it's you - it won't be you, >> so if you are destroyed in the process of making the digital copy, you >> really do die. While in comp the digital copy *is* you, by definition. >> >> ?? Comp is the theory that it will be you after the doctor gives you a >> prothesis for your brain (plus some other assumptions). It will be you >> even after you are duplicated (though it's troubling for JKC that "you" is >> both singular and plural). >> >> Yes, that's right. And primitive materialism would distinguish between > two identical versions of you, if only because they occupy different > positions (and due to no-cloning). So a PM copy could only ever be a "copy > that thinks it's you", while a comp copy would be one that actually is you > (assuming comp is correct, of course). > > The Everett copy is different because it cannot interact with it's > original, so they can have the same past including spacetime location. In > Bruno's thought experiment the M copy and the W copy are physically > different. If comp is true then at the most fundamental level it's > impossible to have copies; it would be like having copies of the number 7. >
Insofar as I understand comp, it's not only possible to have copies, but there are an infinite number of them responsible for every moment of conscious experience. These are "relative computations" or something similar. I expect Bruno will explain better when he appears. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
