On 26 June 2014 12:03, LizR <lizj...@gmail.com> wrote: > On 25 June 2014 16:52, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > >> On 6/24/2014 2:29 AM, LizR wrote: >> >> On 24 June 2014 17:04, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >> >>> >>>> If primitive matter existed, and if it has a role for consciousness, or >>>> for consciousness instantiation, step 8, and the argument above, makes that >>>> role very mysterious, so much that it is not clear why we could still say >>>> yes to the doctor in virtue of correct digital rendering. >>>> >>> >>> You can still say yes to the doctor because he is going to use matter >>> to make your brain prosthesis. >>> >> >> Surely that will just be a copy that thinks it's you - it won't be you, >> so if you are destroyed in the process of making the digital copy, you >> really do die. While in comp the digital copy *is* you, by definition. >> >> ?? Comp is the theory that it will be you after the doctor gives you a >> prothesis for your brain (plus some other assumptions). It will be you >> even after you are duplicated (though it's troubling for JKC that "you" is >> both singular and plural). >> >> Yes, that's right. And primitive materialism would distinguish between > two identical versions of you, if only because they occupy different > positions (and due to no-cloning). So a PM copy could only ever be a "copy > that thinks it's you", while a comp copy would be one that actually is you > (assuming comp is correct, of course). >
I don't think "comp" necessarily includes the idea that the copy would be you, just that the copy would be conscious in the same way as you. Obviously it is *necessary* that the copy be conscious if it is also you, but whether it is *sufficient* is a further argument in the philosophy of personal identity. I think it is sufficient, but not everyone agrees. Derek Partfit's book "Reasons and Persons" discusses these questions. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
