On 1 July 2014 03:14, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > > On 30 Jun 2014, at 02:14, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > > On 26 June 2014 12:03, LizR <lizj...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> On 25 June 2014 16:52, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >>> >>> On 6/24/2014 2:29 AM, LizR wrote: >>> >>> On 24 June 2014 17:04, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> If primitive matter existed, and if it has a role for consciousness, or >>>>> for consciousness instantiation, step 8, and the argument above, makes >>>>> that role very mysterious, so much that it is not clear why we could >>>>> still say yes to the doctor in virtue of correct digital rendering. >>>> >>>> >>>> You can still say yes to the doctor because he is going to use matter to >>>> make your brain prosthesis. >>> >>> >>> Surely that will just be a copy that thinks it's you - it won't be you, so >>> if you are destroyed in the process of making the digital copy, you really >>> do die. While in comp the digital copy is you, by definition. >>> >>> ?? Comp is the theory that it will be you after the doctor gives you a >>> prothesis for your brain (plus some other assumptions). It will be you >>> even after you are duplicated (though it's troubling for JKC that "you" is >>> both singular and plural). >>> >> Yes, that's right. And primitive materialism would distinguish between two >> identical versions of you, if only because they occupy different positions >> (and due to no-cloning). So a PM copy could only ever be a "copy that thinks >> it's you", while a comp copy would be one that actually is you (assuming >> comp is correct, of course). > > > I don't think "comp" necessarily includes the idea that the copy would be > you, just that the copy would be conscious in the same way as you. > > > Then you are using "comp" in a different sense than in the UDA. I mean that > if the copy is conscious in the same way as you, but still is not you (which > is often argued with the teleportation without annihilation), then you would > not say that you survive in the usual clinical sense of surviving from the > first person perspective. The other guy would only be a well done impostor > and you would say "No thanks" to the doctor. >
OK, I misunderstood this part of your definition. You have suggested that comp requires faith, but I thought that this faith involves believing that the computerised brain will have the same sort of consciousness as the original; not faith that the copy will be the same person as the original. The latter claim, I think, follows from the former logically and not as a matter of faith, because its negation would result in absurdity as I could then state that I do not survive from one moment to the next but only have the delusional belief that I do. > > Obviously it is *necessary* that the copy be conscious if it is also you, but > whether it is *sufficient* is a further argument in the philosophy of > personal identity. I think it is sufficient, but not everyone agrees. Derek > Partfit's book "Reasons and Persons" discusses these questions. > > > I think Parfit is wrong on this, and I vaguely remember having thought that > it was that error which prevents him to see the FPI. I thought that he would > have grasped the SWE, he would have understood (as I think you do) that such > a personal identity notion (distinguishing the two comp notion referred > above) makes not much sense. > I might take a further look. > > Bruno > > > > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
