On 01 Jul 2014, at 02:50, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 1 July 2014 03:14, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 30 Jun 2014, at 02:14, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 26 June 2014 12:03, LizR <lizj...@gmail.com> wrote:
On 25 June 2014 16:52, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 6/24/2014 2:29 AM, LizR wrote:
On 24 June 2014 17:04, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
If primitive matter existed, and if it has a role for
consciousness, or for consciousness instantiation, step 8, and
the argument above, makes that role very mysterious, so much
that it is not clear why we could still say yes to the doctor
in virtue of correct digital rendering.
You can still say yes to the doctor because he is going to use
matter to make your brain prosthesis.
Surely that will just be a copy that thinks it's you - it won't
be you, so if you are destroyed in the process of making the
digital copy, you really do die. While in comp the digital copy
is you, by definition.
?? Comp is the theory that it will be you after the doctor gives
you a prothesis for your brain (plus some other assumptions). It
will be you even after you are duplicated (though it's troubling
for JKC that "you" is both singular and plural).
Yes, that's right. And primitive materialism would distinguish
between two identical versions of you, if only because they occupy
different positions (and due to no-cloning). So a PM copy could
only ever be a "copy that thinks it's you", while a comp copy
would be one that actually is you (assuming comp is correct, of
course).
I don't think "comp" necessarily includes the idea that the copy
would be you, just that the copy would be conscious in the same way
as you.
Then you are using "comp" in a different sense than in the UDA. I
mean that if the copy is conscious in the same way as you, but
still is not you (which is often argued with the teleportation
without annihilation), then you would not say that you survive in
the usual clinical sense of surviving from the first person
perspective. The other guy would only be a well done impostor and
you would say "No thanks" to the doctor.
OK, I misunderstood this part of your definition. You have suggested
that comp requires faith, but I thought that this faith involves
believing that the computerised brain will have the same sort of
consciousness as the original; not faith that the copy will be the
same person as the original. The latter claim, I think, follows from
the former logically and not as a matter of faith, because its
negation would result in absurdity as I could then state that I do not
survive from one moment to the next but only have the delusional
belief that I do.
OK.
Bruno
Obviously it is *necessary* that the copy be conscious if it is
also you, but whether it is *sufficient* is a further argument in
the philosophy of personal identity. I think it is sufficient, but
not everyone agrees. Derek Partfit's book "Reasons and Persons"
discusses these questions.
I think Parfit is wrong on this, and I vaguely remember having
thought that it was that error which prevents him to see the FPI. I
thought that he would have grasped the SWE, he would have
understood (as I think you do) that such a personal identity notion
(distinguishing the two comp notion referred above) makes not much
sense.
I might take a further look.
Bruno
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Stathis Papaioannou
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