On 12/19/2013 1:03 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Dec 19, 2013 at 2:36 PM, John Mikes <jami...@gmail.com
<mailto:jami...@gmail.com>> wrote:
Here is my tuppence about the *hoax-game* of the *fantasy-play*
'teleportation':
It is what I said, never substantiated and placed into circumstances never
substantiated or verified even within our imaginary physical(?)
explanations.
Wana play? be my guest.
In a 'transportation' (cf: reincarnation-like?) one is supposed to receive
new
identity as fitting for the new circumstances, with memory arased of the
old one.
YOU2 is NOT YOU1. (Not even YOU1*).
If you don't accept in step 1 then computationalism is false (which is possible, but it
was an explicit assumption on which the rest of the reasoning is based).
Why should we think computationalism is true? Our particles are substituted all the
time through normal metabolism, so the particular parts are not important so long as the
pattern is preserved. Further, no known laws of physics are incomputable, so then the
brain must use some, as of yet, undiscovered physics in order to assert computationalism
is false.
I don't think it's that simple. Obviously if you substitute atom-for-atom it will be
successful because (according to our best theories) atom are indistinguishable. But
suppose you try to substitute a silicon chip implant for some part of the brain with
identical, functional i/o at all the neuron interfaces it replaced. Would it preserve
your consciousness? I think it would approximately; but there are possible differences.
It wouldn't react the same to EM fields, cosmic rays, potassium radioactive in the
blood,... So it might be a little different. Second, it would have the plasticity of
neurons, the ability to grow and shrink and change in response to 'learning', i.e.
interaction with other parts.
Now I know Bruno will say this is just choosing the wrong level, but the point is that
it's not just the level which is sufficient for interaction with neurons, but also the
level which captures interaction with 'external' or 'environmental' variables, especially
perceptions. Then we must contemplate not just replacing some brain components, but
simulating some of the external world. So it seems to me there is a tradeoff. If we want
to preserve consciousness unaffected just by replacements in the brain, those replacements
will need to be at a very low level. So low that the quantum non-cloning theorem comes
into play and it can't be done except by chance. On the other hand we can do a
substitution that is behaviorally so similar that the difference will be unnoticable even
by close friends, but which maybe different at the incommunicable consciousness level. Or
a third "possibility" is that we can simulate the consciousness AND it's interaction with
the world so that both the internal functions, plasticity, and external affects are
preserve. But then the penalty is effectively creating another world - which is what
Everettian splitting does.
So in effect the non-cloning theorem prevents saying "yes" to the doctor if you insist on
there being no discontinuity in your consciousness. The Moscow man and the Washington man
will be in different quantum states even before they step out of the teleporter and see
what city they are in. Of course in practice we're not particularly concerned with small
gaps in consciousness. None of this implies some undiscovered physics.
Brent
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