On 26 Jun 2014, at 05:51, LizR wrote:
On 26 June 2014 15:44, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 6/25/2014 8:38 PM, LizR wrote:
On 26 June 2014 15:25, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 6/25/2014 6:47 PM, LizR wrote:
On 26 June 2014 09:08, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 6/25/2014 11:48 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
Now I know Bruno will say this is just choosing the wrong level,
but the point is that it's not just the level which is sufficient
for interaction with neurons, but also the level which captures
interaction with 'external' or 'environmental' variables,
especially perceptions. Then we must contemplate not just
replacing some brain components, but simulating some of the
external world. So it seems to me there is a tradeoff.
This is why Bruno often says you can assume the whole milky-way
galaxy. Which makes no theoretical difference once you assume the
laws of physics are computable. If you emulate a large enough
volume, then it takes some FTL effect beyond the past light cone
of the emulated volume to mess things up.
Exactly. But that's why I don't find step 8 convincing. If you
have to simulate so much that you've essentially created a
simulated world, then all you've shown is that a simulated
consciousness can exist in a simulated world and this is
indpendent of the physical substrate.
Not quite. If you assume no zombies, then you've shown that an
actual consciousness can exist in a simulated world.
Sure, that's already implicit in assuming consciousness is produced
by certain computational processes.
Yes, so there was no need to say "simulated" above. It looked as
though you were trying to make a distinction when there isn't one.
There's not a distinction that makes one consciousness different
from the other, except that one is conscious of the simulated world
and one is conscious of this world.
And if the simulation is good enough they have identical
experiences, so - no different at all. In fact it's hard to believe
that consciousness is something that can be "simulated", regardless
of how its achieved I imagine it's always actual, by definition,
whether it's experiencing a simulated world or a real one (which is
also a simulation, at least in our case, as I believe Kant pointed
out).
I take Bruno (and Maudlin) to be arguing that there need not be any
physical process to instantiate consciousness - and that is what I
find unconvincing.
To be sure, both Maudlin and the MGA shows that comp and mechanism are
incompatible, but maudlin takes this as a "difficulty" for the
computationalist, and I take it as a difficulty for the (weak)
materialist (just because I work in comp).
Note that it is an arithmetical fact that arithmetic emulates all
simulations. Saying that some of those are more real than other is a
metaphysical assumption, and MGA shows that it is a gap-of-the-god
type of assumption.
I realise that you find it unconvincing, of course, and I am still
hopeful that you will come up with a convincing reason why, i.e. one
that doesn't just say "I just don't see how X can be true". (Or that
Bruno will come up with a convincing reason why not. (Or maybe I'll
just remain agnostic indefinitely, which is probably best...))
if comp is true, *and* if one universal number execution U needs to be
reifed with some primary matter (like with common physicalism), then
it is up to you to explain the role of the special U in consciousness,
and this without extracting that "winning" U from the measure problem.
This means that you will need to invent a specifically *non testable*
notion of primitive matter exactly at the place where comp proves that
if it exist we can test it.
It is weird that when someone use creationist god-of-the-gap in an
argument, most people see the logical or epistemological deficiency,
but yet when people use the primitive-matter-of-the-gap, they don't
see it.
Well, we see that people can't already change their mind after 70
years of brainwashing (like in the cannabis file), so it is not so
astonishing that they find hard to abandon the primary matter of
Aristotle, which is 1500 years of brainwashing. Matter is visible, but
primitive (assumed) matter is not.
It is not a question of truth, but of valid or not argument in the
applied fields.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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