On 6/25/2014 8:38 PM, LizR wrote:
On 26 June 2014 15:25, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:On 6/25/2014 6:47 PM, LizR wrote:On 26 June 2014 09:08, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: On 6/25/2014 11:48 AM, Jason Resch wrote:Now I know Bruno will say this is just choosing the wrong level, but the point is that it's not just the level which is sufficient for interaction with neurons, but also the level which captures interaction with 'external' or 'environmental' variables, especially perceptions. Then we must contemplate not just replacing some brain components, but simulating some of the external world. So it seems to me there is a tradeoff. This is why Bruno often says you can assume the whole milky-way galaxy. Which makes no theoretical difference once you assume the laws of physics are computable. If you emulate a large enough volume, then it takes some FTL effect beyond the past light cone of the emulated volume to mess things up.Exactly. But that's why I don't find step 8 convincing. If you have to simulate so much that you've essentially created a simulated world, then all you've shown is that a *simulated *consciousness can exist in a *simulated *world and this is indpendent of the physical substrate. Not quite. If you assume no zombies, then you've shown that an /actual/ consciousness can exist in a simulated world.Sure, that's already implicit in assuming consciousness is produced by certain computational processes.Yes, so there was no need to say "simulated" above. It looked as though you were trying to make a distinction when there isn't one.
There's not a distinction that makes one consciousness different from the other, except that one is conscious of the simulated world and one is conscious of this world. I take Bruno (and Maudlin) to be arguing that there need not be any physical process to instantiate consciousness - and that is what I find unconvincing.
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