On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 06:09:56PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: > On 9/18/2014 5:46 PM, Russell Standish wrote: > >Consciousness has a state (which we call the > >observer moment). If that state differs, then the state of the > >supervened must also differ. > > > >Thus consciousness cannot supervene on the UD* as it doesn't change > >for a change of state of consciousness. > > This seems to me to arise from equivocation about "consciousness". > You are treating it, as I experience it, as a temporal phenomenon - > a succession of thoughts, an inner narrative. That's the > consciousness I'd like to be able to program/engineer/understand. > But Bruno make's consciousness a potentiality of an axiomatic > system, for which he seems almost everything alive as a model (in > the mathematical sense), anything that could instantiate an > "if-then" or a "controlled-controlled-not". And he says that > salvia makes him think consciousness need not be temporal - which > might be like whiskey sometimes makes me think the ground sways.
Even if considered as a block atemporal phenomenon, it is still a succession of states that supevene on a sequence of states of the supervened on. To consider it as something else evacuates the concept of consiousness, which must be about seeing something, not everything. I have no problem in assuming that a sequence of conscious states may supervene on a program (running or not), and that a different program running through the same sequence of states (eg the replay of a recording) may well not correspond to a conscious state. But the UD, whilst running every program, is not passing through the sequence of states in the same order as the original program. And as I point out, a different conscious experience will not result in a change to the UD calculation. To state that conscious still supervenes on the UD does violence to the definition of supervenience we are using. > From Bruno's viewpoint the UD* just IS and Alice's different > thoughts as different times are just computations of those thoughts > which are correlated with computations of those times. That may > resolve the atemporal UD vs the temporal experience, but it still > doesn't explain consciousness. It doesn't explain what computations > of Alice's are constitute her consciousness as opposed to her > subconsciousness or her brain functions or other stuff going on. It > is not an answer to say, well maybe everything in conscious. > Exactly. -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
