Sent from AOL Mobile Mail I think the capability to "think about thinking", would be the ultimate thing to decide if someone or something is truly conscious. And yes I'm Duplainville even though were alive you're not completely conscious, all the time. A dog chasing his tail is where chasing his tail or were feeling things, but is not fully conscious perhaps neither is a Motorist driving under the influence, truly conscience will he or she is driving their way home after a big night at the bar.
This of course is why there are so many motorist accidents or people are under the influence of alcohol or drugs. That is to say, and judges, worldwide agrees with me, they deliberately making themselves less conscious. I'm asking if the machine is truly conscious or or not? I am sort of counting on the probability that yes we can, and yes we will. Unlike Chalmers, I feel that consciousness is also self reflection, self referencing, and thinking about how we interact with others. Qualia aside, I think that the consciousness to self reflecte is essential. -----Original Message----- From: Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au> To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com> Sent: Thu, Sep 18, 2014 07:38 PM Subject: Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience <div id="AOLMsgPart_1_85cbbc00-d03c-4367-9dbe-0743d4f0ba55" style="margin: 0px;font-family: Tahoma, Verdana, Arial, Sans-Serif;font-size: 12px;color: #000;background-color: #fff;"> <pre style="font-size: 9pt;"><tt>On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 06:05:26PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > >Self-aware means "aware of your self". > > Hmm... It is a bit ambiguous, because that awareness can be > implicit, like I assume for the consciousness of a worm, or > explicit, which I assume for more complex animals. > > How do you distinguish awareness from self-awareness? > Presumably, it is possible to be aware of something, without being aware of a self. I imagine Casper the ghost would feel like that! More realistically, it is possible not to be aware of one's own body. Dogs chasing their tails comes to mind - but that situation is complicated, as sometimes they might do it for play, but be quite aware that it's their own tail they're chasing. Animals that fight their own images in a mirror are to some extent not self-aware, although presumably that have a working proprioception system, which is a kind of self-awareness (assuming they are aware to start with). > > > >One could say self-conscious as being "conscious of your self", except > >that I don't think there is any distinction in meaning between > >awareness and consciousness. > > > >BTW - conceptually, I don't see any inherent reason why a self is > >needed just to be aware (or conscious), except that a self is a bloody > >useful thing, evolutionarily speaking - helps the immune system stop > >parasites and pathogens, for example - also helps you stop injuring > >your body (see what happens to people who lose their sense of touch, > >or their proprioception or nociception (pain)). > > The 3p self is the body, or the Gödel number of that body. It is > what the doctor will put on the hard disk, and a program can refer > to itself in that sense through the Dx = "xx" method. It is captured > by the modal box of the modal logic of self-reference. That self is > not "conscious". It can only manifest your 1p-self (closer to > consciousness) when in company of God (truth). But then it lost his > name, and is not really a machine. > > > > > > > >>> > >>>I address this in the paper. > >> > >>But my comment sum up where I disagree. I will comment more > >>precisely when I have more times. > >> > >> > >> > >>>What you go on to say that consciousness > >>>C (ie the consciousness attached to body C, which is in B) > >>>supervenes > >>>on B+A, which is correct. > >> > >>OK, so you agree that Alice's consciousness supervenes on Alice's > >>body + Bob's body + the room + the entire universe + the entire UD*. > >>OK? > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >>>But my point is that consciousness itself > >>>(not necessarily attached to a particular body or person) > >> > >>You mean the existence of consciousness? > >> > >> > >> > >>>is not > >>>supervenient on B+A in this case, as the consciousness could > >>>be a C or > >>>a D (where D supervenes on A). > >> > >>? > >>I agree, (assuming always some neuro-assumption to make things > >>simple) that Alice's consciousness does not supervene on Bob's brain > >>activity, but it does supervenes on Alice + Bob brains activities. > >> > >> > >> > >>> > >>>Where this matters is that one cannot say consciousness > >>>supervenes on > >>>the universal dovetailer. > >> > >>I really don't see this. That contradict the fact that if A > >>supervenes on B, it supervenes on A+B. > >> > >>If Alice consciousness supervenes on say one computation in the UD*, > >>it supervenes on that computation + all the others. > >> > > > >The computation here is the UD. If Alice experiences a different > >thought, then the UD does not change, as the UD calculates that > >experience too. Consequently, Alice's consciousness cannot supervene > >on the UD itself. Only on some computations that the UD executes. > > To change Alice consciousness "here and now" you need to change the UD*. > What does "here and now" even mean in this context? > The fact that is is impossible does not change the fact that Alice > consciousness supervenes on the UD*. > This statement is inconsistent. > > > > > > >Assuming COMP, of course. > > > Of course, and some high level of substitution. > Actually, no, this is not required. But let's continue. > > > > > > >Maybe the classroom analogy is not clearly enough expressed, because > >you still say Alice's consciousness, not consciousness (in general) > > > What is "consciousness (in general)"? Is it the existence of > consciousness? No - I distinguish that case. I can't remember whether I left it in the MGA paper, or deleted it because it just confused the the main point of the paper. Consciousness has a state (which we call the observer moment). If that state differs, then the state of the supervened must also differ. Thus consciousness cannot supervene on the UD* as it doesn't change for a change of state of consciousness. In this case I would say something like > "consciousness in general supervenes on computations and truth". > Consciousness is first person. It is more related to some "[]p & p" > or "[]p & <>p" (& p), than to any 3p "[]p". > > Even for p sigma_1 (even on p sigma_0) we don't have, from the > machine's point of view, that p <-> []p. We do have p -> []p, but > the reciprocal []p -> p is only true in G* minus G, so machines > can't believe in it "rationally", only guess it instinctively, and > with the development of self-reflexion, this will look weird for > her. The conjunction with truth makes consciousness, awareness, > knowledge, into non propositional attitudes. Most of the machine's > first person knowledge is non representational. It is not in the > brain, it is in the relation between the brain and the whole > (sigma_1, or more) truth. > > Bruno > > > > > > > > > >-- > > > >---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > >Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > >Principal, High Performance Coders > >Visiting Professor of Mathematics <a > >href="mailto:hpco...@hpcoders.com.au";>hpco...@hpcoders.com.au</a> > >University of New South Wales <a href="http://www.hpcoders.com.au"; > >target="_blank">http://www.hpcoders.com.au</a> > > > >Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret > > (<a href="http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html"; > > target="_blank">http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html</a>) > >---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > >-- > >You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > >Groups "Everything List" group. > >To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, > >send an email to <a > >href="mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com";>everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com</a>. > >To post to this group, send email to <a > >href="mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com";>everything-list@googlegroups.com</a>. > >Visit this group at <a href="http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list"; > >target="_blank">http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list</a>. > >For more options, visit <a href="https://groups.google.com/d/optout"; > >target="_blank">https://groups.google.com/d/optout</a>. > > <a href="http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/"; > target="_blank">http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/</a> > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to <a > href="mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com";>everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com</a>. > To post to this group, send email to <a > href="mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com";>everything-list@googlegroups.com</a>. > Visit this group at <a href="http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list"; > target="_blank">http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list</a>. > For more options, visit <a href="https://groups.google.com/d/optout"; > target="_blank">https://groups.google.com/d/optout</a>. -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics <a href="mailto:hpco...@hpcoders.com.au";>hpco...@hpcoders.com.au</a> University of New South Wales <a href="http://www.hpcoders.com.au"; target="_blank">http://www.hpcoders.com.au</a> Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (<a href="http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html"; target="_blank">http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html</a>) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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