On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote:
It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions just to say
that he doesn't care about comp, OR state what he agrees or disagrees with in Bruno's
stated argument.
Just saying it's "obviously wrong" doesn't really cut it. So far the only real
(non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've heard comes down to a semantic quibble
to do with redefining our concept of an individual person. This is exactly the same
redefinition that was brought up by Everett in 1957. It isn't in itself contentious - a
physicist who believes the MWI to be correct will come to the same conclusions about
indeterminacy that someone using Bruno's matter transmitter would - that it's a
phenomenon experienced from a first person perspective because of the person in question
being split into two copies. The phenomena actually map onto each other, because both
comp and Everett allow for the possibility that from the third person viewpoint the
duplication could be observed - quantum computers rely on precisely that fact.
Quantum computers (of the circuit type) rely on interference to pick out the right
solution. Interference implies superposition in the same world. I highly recommend Scott
Aaronson's blog http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/ , for straight talk about quantum
computing (his book "Quantum Computing Since Democritus" is also very good).
Brent
Hence, the fact that comp says that such splitting can occur doesn't disprove comp
unless it also disproves Everett.
And of course, making up silly versions of Bruno's acronyms also doesn't show that comp
is wrong. It certainly didn't work for Fred Hoyle's attempts to ridicule the Big Bang.
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