On 4/14/2015 3:55 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 14 April 2015 at 17:48, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com <javascript:;>>
wrote:
>
>
> 2015-04-14 9:40 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com
<javascript:;>>:
>>
>> On 14 April 2015 at 17:05, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com
<javascript:;>> wrote:
>>
>> >> I don't see any difference between a metaphysical theory saying
>> >> consciousness is not duplicable and one saying bananas are not
>> >> duplicable: it is still coherent and non-contradictory to imagine
>> >> either entity being duplicated.
>> >
>> >
>> > No it is not, you even use a logical fallacy to justify this position...
>> > using "miracles"... a miracle imply *anything* is possible (even logical
>> > contradictory thing such as.... a *miracle*).
>>
>> No, a miracle cannot be logically contradictory. God cannot make a
>> married bachelor.
>
>
> Yes it can.. that's the whole point of what is a miracle and God. God is not
> bound to logic, what you can't conceive is your prejudice... and using
> miracles to justify your thinking is a logical fallacy... you can with that
> same argument *justify anything*.
>
>>
>>
>> > So I disagree with you on tha point, a theory could assert consciousness
>> > is
>> > not duplicable (in practice and in theory, like you can't go faster than
>> > light) without being self contradictory (and you can use as much
>> > miracles as
>> > you want to say it is still possible logically, it's still a logical
>> > fallacy
>> > to do that).
>>
>> You seem to be talking about physical possibility, whereas for the
>> purpose of showing that there is a conceptual problem with the idea of
>> personal identity only logical possibility is needed.
>
>
> As I said, it is you who're not seeing you're making a metaphysical
> commitment on the idea, and your idea is sumarrized by "consciousness is
> duplicable"... you start with an *if* then you make it like it was never
> there in the first place to conclude what you want, it's begging the
> question... Yes ***IF*** consciousness is duplicable, it is duplicable...
> you've not shown that *IT IS*.
OK, I did say at one point "if consciousness is duplicable". That does not necessarily
imply anything about its truth; for example, I could say "if all bachelors are unmarried
men" and then go on to assert that it is in fact the case because it's analytically
true. There is a substantive issue to discuss if we are asking whether it is physically
possible to duplicate consciousness, because it depends on the particular theory of
consciousness, whether physicalist or dualist or whatever, as well as certain other
facts about the world, such as whether the physics in the brain is Turing emulable. But
whether consciousness is LOGICALLY duplicable is a separate question, which has a
bearing on the problem of physical identity. I think it is obvious that consciousness is
logically duplicable, because try as I might I cannot find any contradiction in the
idea, nor have you demonstrated any.
Depending on how it is defined, I think an individual's consciousness may not be
duplicable. Suppose I define my consciousness as my stream of thoughts, including
perceptions, and I also define me as that stream of thoughts. Then there cannot be a
duplicate. If x=(Brent's consciousness) and y=(Brent's consciousness) then that entails
x=y. It would be like asking if one can duplicate the number 5.
I don't know why we're arguing so much about this, because as far as I'm aware the
possibility of duplicating consciousness isn't something even hard core religious types
worry too much about. They would claim that a soul cannot be duplicated by physical
means, not that it can't be duplicated at all.
But what would it mean to duplicate consciousness. It doesn't have a location in
spacetime, so any two instances will be identical and hence only one by Leibniz's identity
of indiscernables.
Brent
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