On 14 April 2015 at 16:31, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> > Some sort of dualisms could allow duplication others don't. Saying you >> > can >> > whatever methaphysical axioms is false. Consciousness could be linked >> > for >> > example by an invisible force to your body by an unknown and unknowable >> > and >> > unmeasurable link that cannot ne copied or associated to another body. >> > Starting with if consciousness is duplicable, then letting the if down >> > *is* >> > a metaphysical commitment. As far as real science goes we have never >> > ever >> > duplicated consciousness. I'm not saying it is not possible, because as >> > I >> > recall to you, I mainly believe in computationalism, but right now all >> > options are open and even if one day we can and do make copies, we're >> > still >> > lacking any sharable tests that can without questions prove it or give >> > enough evidences. >> >> Certainly some theories of consciousness might not allow copying, but >> that cannot be a logical requirement. To claim that something is >> logically impossible is to claim that it is self-contradictory. > > I don't see why a theory saying like I said in the upper paragraph that > consciousness could not be copied would be selfcontradictory... You have to > see that when you say consciousness is duplicatable, you assume a lot of > things about the reality and how it is working, and that you're making a > metaphysical commitment, a leap of faith concerning what you assume the real > to be and the reality itself. That's all I'm saying, but clearly if > computationalism is true consciousness is obviously duplicatable. I don't see any difference between a metaphysical theory saying consciousness is not duplicable and one saying bananas are not duplicable: it is still coherent and non-contradictory to imagine either entity being duplicated. For consideration of conundrums of personal identity - which is where this discussion started - it is enough merely to consider the logical possibility of duplication. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
