2015-04-14 15:56 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com>: > > > On Tuesday, April 14, 2015, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> >> >> 2015-04-14 12:55 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com>: >> >>> >>> >>> On 14 April 2015 at 17:48, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> > >>> > >>> > 2015-04-14 9:40 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com>: >>> >> >>> >> On 14 April 2015 at 17:05, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >> >>> >> >> I don't see any difference between a metaphysical theory saying >>> >> >> consciousness is not duplicable and one saying bananas are not >>> >> >> duplicable: it is still coherent and non-contradictory to imagine >>> >> >> either entity being duplicated. >>> >> > >>> >> > >>> >> > No it is not, you even use a logical fallacy to justify this >>> position... >>> >> > using "miracles"... a miracle imply *anything* is possible (even >>> logical >>> >> > contradictory thing such as.... a *miracle*). >>> >> >>> >> No, a miracle cannot be logically contradictory. God cannot make a >>> >> married bachelor. >>> > >>> > >>> > Yes it can.. that's the whole point of what is a miracle and God. God >>> is not >>> > bound to logic, what you can't conceive is your prejudice... and using >>> > miracles to justify your thinking is a logical fallacy... you can with >>> that >>> > same argument *justify anything*. >>> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> > So I disagree with you on tha point, a theory could assert >>> consciousness >>> >> > is >>> >> > not duplicable (in practice and in theory, like you can't go faster >>> than >>> >> > light) without being self contradictory (and you can use as much >>> >> > miracles as >>> >> > you want to say it is still possible logically, it's still a logical >>> >> > fallacy >>> >> > to do that). >>> >> >>> >> You seem to be talking about physical possibility, whereas for the >>> >> purpose of showing that there is a conceptual problem with the idea of >>> >> personal identity only logical possibility is needed. >>> > >>> > >>> > As I said, it is you who're not seeing you're making a metaphysical >>> > commitment on the idea, and your idea is sumarrized by "consciousness >>> is >>> > duplicable"... you start with an *if* then you make it like it was >>> never >>> > there in the first place to conclude what you want, it's begging the >>> > question... Yes ***IF*** consciousness is duplicable, it is >>> duplicable... >>> > you've not shown that *IT IS*. >>> >>> OK, I did say at one point "if consciousness is duplicable". That does >>> not necessarily imply anything about its truth; for example, I could say >>> "if all bachelors are unmarried men" and then go on to assert that it is in >>> fact the case because it's analytically true. There is a substantive issue >>> to discuss if we are asking whether it is physically possible to duplicate >>> consciousness, because it depends on the particular theory of >>> consciousness, whether physicalist or dualist or whatever, as well as >>> certain other facts about the world, such as whether the physics in the >>> brain is Turing emulable. But whether consciousness is LOGICALLY duplicable >>> is a separate question, which has a bearing on the problem of physical >>> identity. I think it is obvious that consciousness is logically duplicable, >> >> >> Not it is not... it bears on the foundation of reality... so depending on >> the metaphysical stance you have, it can or cannot *logically* be >> duplicated. >> >> I don't see how logic *alone* can entails that consciousness is >> duplicable or not... you have not demonstrated such thing. >> >> Logically means it follows logical laws and rules of inference... if you >> start with the axiom that consciousness is unique and cannot be duplicated >> by its essence of being unique, then it is unique and cannot be duplicated >> in that theory... and it contradicts absolutely no logic... >> >> Statement about consciousness duplication are true or not depending on >> the theory of consciousness you use... so the *IF* is necessary and cannot >> be dismissed *without* specifying in the first place the theory(ies) of >> consciousnes you're using. >> > > I imagine a copy that thinks just like me, feels just like me, remembers > what I remember, bears the same relationship to me as I bear to my self of > a moment ago.
I can too, and I can imagine, that the copy think it is me but is missing something the original would have noticed but not the copy. > Perhaps this can't actually be created depending on what theory of > consciousness you subscribe to, but I can imagine it - it is not incoherent, I didn't say it was incoherent, what I say, is that it is rooted in a metaphysical commitment and is not an absolute truth. > and it can't be uni-imagined. If you then say, "yes, but that copy you > imagine would not really be a copy, because by assumption consciousness is > non-duplicable", that then makes the notion of continuity of consciousness > incoherent. But who said that it has to be ? If the reality is inconsistent, it is inconsistent even if you wished it must not be, if it is, it is and that's all. Also, it seems vaccuous to say that you can do a copy if in theory of reality you have, you'll never been able to do it even in principle. Like the theory I've said earlier, where consciousness is linked to the body by a thing we can't access (and even know, because our instrument can't measure it, and no instrument we could ever build could do it)... in that theory (which I don't believe of course) *you can't make a copy*. That reality would not be inconsistent. > For it would mean that there is a special quality conferring continuity > which makes no objective and no subjective difference - which is no > difference at all. But it would make a difference, because *that special quality* would *prevent* you to do any copy... you'll *never* be able to do one in such reality, you could wish it all you want, you would not be able to do it... so it would make a subjective difference, because you couldn't have a copy pretending to be you and do everything you do and have all the memory you have, so the pretended copy would not have any subjective POV *at all*. Quentin > > > >> because try as I might I cannot find any contradiction in the idea, >> >> >> Like I said, if you start from the assumption that consciousness is *not* >> duplicable, then it contradicts your statement. >> >> >>> nor have you demonstrated any. >> >> >> I just did, consider that it can't be duplicable, then your statement >> doesn't follow and is in direct contradiction to the assumption. You have >> not demonstrated that taking that consciousness is not duplicable as axiom >> leads to logical contradiction (and we don't have to go as far as taking it >> as axiom to show that ontology where consciousness is not duplicable are >> *logically* conceivable)... >> >> >> >>> >>> I don't know why we're arguing so much about this, because as far as I'm >>> aware the possibility of duplicating consciousness isn't something even >>> hard core religious types worry too much about. >>> >> >> I'm just pointing out that the statement "consciousness is duplicable" is >> a commitment on some metaphysics defining what consciousness is. I believe >> in computationalism, so yes I do believe consciousness (or should I say 1st >> person point of view or personal identity) is duplicable, because it >> follows it is from the theory... but without a theory about consciousness >> and what it is, you can't dismiss the *if*. >> >> Quentin >> >> >>> They would claim that a soul cannot be duplicated by physical means, not >>> that it can't be duplicated at all. >>> >>> -- >>> Stathis Papaioannou >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Stathis Papaioannou >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> >> >> >> -- >> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy >> Batty/Rutger Hauer) >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. 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