2015-04-15 9:19 GMT+02:00 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>: > > On 15 Apr 2015, at 08:33, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > > 2015-04-15 5:12 GMT+02:00 meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>: > >> On 4/14/2015 9:47 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >> >> >> 2015-04-14 18:40 GMT+02:00 meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>: >> >>> On 4/13/2015 11:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>> >>> >>> Le 14 avr. 2015 08:04, "Stathis Papaioannou" <stath...@gmail.com> a >>> écrit : >>> >>> > Certainly some theories of consciousness might not allow copying, but >>> > that cannot be a logical requirement. To claim that something is >>> > logically impossible is to claim that it is self-contradictory. >>> >>> I don't see why a theory saying like I said in the upper paragraph that >>> consciousness could not be copied would be selfcontradictory... You have to >>> see that when you say consciousness is duplicatable, you assume a lot of >>> things about the reality and how it is working, and that you're making a >>> metaphysical commitment, a leap of faith concerning what you assume the >>> real to be and the reality itself. That's all I'm saying, but clearly if >>> computationalism is true consciousness is obviously duplicatable. >>> >>> Quentin >>> >>> In order to say what duplication of consciousness is and whether it is >>> non-contradictory you need some propositional definition of it. Not just, >>> an instrospective "well everybody knows what it is". >>> >>> >> It seems that's what I was explaining... or are you answering to >> Stathis ? >> >> >> No, it's not clear to me what definition of consciousness you're using. >> Are you supposing that two streams of thought which are identical would >> constitute two different consciousness'es? >> > > I have don't have to have one, I don't pretend anything about > consciousness, I'm saying Stathis does have one *to pretend* consciousness > is duplicable; and that his statement "consciousness is duplicable" is > rooted in a metaphysical commitment to one (o > r more) theorie(s) about reality, without that commitment "consciousness > is duplicable" has no meaning by itself and is not an absolute truth... are > you really reading what I write, or only what you want to read ? > > > Consciousness is pure 1p view, and as such is not duplicable, nor > localizable. It is not in the brain, nor in the physical activity of a > brain, but in the (infinity) of the relevant number relations. But we are > used to ascribe consciousness to bodies (which don't really exist), and so > we can say in the local 3-1 view, that a consciousness has been duplicated. > That will just means that the relative conditions in which that > consciousness can manifest itself have been duplicated, like there are > infinitely multiplied and distributed in arithmetic. > > In fact if we refer to bodies, the 3p is here a 1p-plural-1p-singular > view, really, but this is not relevant (especially if the discussion is on > a point "before step 8/MGA)". > > I don't remember the motivation of the discussion, to see if the > difference of terming is relevant or not. >
As I'm trying to explain (and it really seems not obvious to others, I'm certainly guilty of not making it clear) is that statement such as "consciousness is duplicable..." or "consciousness is not duplicable..." both are statement with unsaid theorie(s) about what is reality and consciousness... without those unsaid theorie(s), these statement by themselve have no meaning and even if those theories are clearly explained, that can't make any of the statement an eternal truth (as you have shown here, under your view, both statements can be true depending on the point of view taken). And what I disagree with Stathis principally, is the usage of "miracles" or "magics" inside a "logical" argument, that's a fallacy, using false can prove anything. Quentin > > Bruno > > > > > Quentin > > >> >> Computationalism would say that a brain is duplicable, but as soon as the >> copy had a different thought there would be two different consciousnesses. >> >> Brent >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > > > -- > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy > Batty/Rutger Hauer) > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
