2015-04-15 20:55 GMT+02:00 meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>: > On 4/14/2015 11:33 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > > 2015-04-15 5:12 GMT+02:00 meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>: > >> On 4/14/2015 9:47 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >> >> >> 2015-04-14 18:40 GMT+02:00 meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>: >> >>> On 4/13/2015 11:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>> >>> >>> Le 14 avr. 2015 08:04, "Stathis Papaioannou" <stath...@gmail.com> a >>> écrit : >>> >>> > Certainly some theories of consciousness might not allow copying, but >>> > that cannot be a logical requirement. To claim that something is >>> > logically impossible is to claim that it is self-contradictory. >>> >>> I don't see why a theory saying like I said in the upper paragraph that >>> consciousness could not be copied would be selfcontradictory... You have to >>> see that when you say consciousness is duplicatable, you assume a lot of >>> things about the reality and how it is working, and that you're making a >>> metaphysical commitment, a leap of faith concerning what you assume the >>> real to be and the reality itself. That's all I'm saying, but clearly if >>> computationalism is true consciousness is obviously duplicatable. >>> >>> Quentin >>> >>> In order to say what duplication of consciousness is and whether it is >>> non-contradictory you need some propositional definition of it. Not just, >>> an instrospective "well everybody knows what it is". >>> >>> >> It seems that's what I was explaining... or are you answering to >> Stathis ? >> >> >> No, it's not clear to me what definition of consciousness you're using. >> Are you supposing that two streams of thought which are identical would >> constitute two different consciousness'es? >> > > I have don't have to have one, I don't pretend anything about > consciousness, I'm saying Stathis does have one *to pretend* consciousness > is duplicable; and that his statement "consciousness is duplicable" is > rooted in a metaphysical commitment to one (o > r more) theorie(s) about reality, > > > I agree that Stathis must be using some unexpressed definition in order to > assert that consciousness is duplicable. But also that you must being > using some different definition to assert that it is not. >
Here I'm sure you don't read what I'm writing, so I will put it in CAPS.... I DON'T PRETEND THAT CONSCIOUSNESS IS DUPLICABLE OR NOT DUPLICABLE, STATHIS PRETEND IT IS AND THAT ANY THEORIES WHO WOULD SAY IT IS NOT MUST BE LOGICALLY INCONSISTENT.. I REPEAT ***I*** DON'T PRETEND THAT CONSCIOUSNESS *IS* DUPLICABLE *OR IS NOT* DUPLICABLE... IF YOU WANT TO KNOW WHAT I BELIEVE I WOULD TEND TOWARD IT IS DUPLICABLE BECAUSE I BELIEVE COMPUTATIONALISM TO BE TRUE, SO I WOULD CERTAINLY NOT HOLD THE THEORY THAT IT IS NOT DUPLICABLE BUT ALSO I DON'T SAY LIKE STATHIS DOES THAT THE POSSIBILITY THAT CONSCIOUSNESS IS DUPLICABLE IS TRUE WHATEVER METAPHYSICAL ASSUMPTION YOU MAKE ABOUT REALITY, BECAUSE THAT'S THAT ASSUMPTION THAT MAKE THE STATEMENT 'CONSCIOUSNESS IS DUPLICABLE' MEANINGFUL OR NOT. SO I REPEAT I'M NOT USING SOME DEFINITION ON CONSCIOUSNESS TO PRETEND IT IS OR IT IS NOT DUPLICABLE, I'M SAYING THAT THE MEANINGFULNESS OF THE STATEMENT DEPEND ON AN UNSTATED ASSUMPTION STATHIS IS MAKING. Quentin > So I'm asking which one you are using? > > Brent > > without that commitment "consciousness is duplicable" has no meaning by > itself and is not an absolute truth... are you really reading what I write, > or only what you want to read ? > > Quentin > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
