On 4/15/2015 12:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 15 Apr 2015, at 08:33, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-04-15 5:12 GMT+02:00 meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
<mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>:
On 4/14/2015 9:47 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-04-14 18:40 GMT+02:00 meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
<mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>:
On 4/13/2015 11:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le 14 avr. 2015 08:04, "Stathis Papaioannou" <stath...@gmail.com
<mailto:stath...@gmail.com>> a écrit :
> Certainly some theories of consciousness might not allow copying, but
> that cannot be a logical requirement. To claim that something is
> logically impossible is to claim that it is self-contradictory.
I don't see why a theory saying like I said in the upper paragraph that
consciousness could not be copied would be selfcontradictory... You
have to
see that when you say consciousness is duplicatable, you assume a lot of
things about the reality and how it is working, and that you're making a
metaphysical commitment, a leap of faith concerning what you assume the
real
to be and the reality itself. That's all I'm saying, but clearly if
computationalism is true consciousness is obviously duplicatable.
Quentin
In order to say what duplication of consciousness is and whether it is
non-contradictory you need some propositional definition of it. Not
just, an
instrospective "well everybody knows what it is".
It seems that's what I was explaining... or are you answering to Stathis ?
No, it's not clear to me what definition of consciousness you're using.
Are you
supposing that two streams of thought which are identical would constitute
two
different consciousness'es?
I have don't have to have one, I don't pretend anything about consciousness, I'm saying
Stathis does have one *to pretend* consciousness is duplicable; and that his statement
"consciousness is duplicable" is rooted in a metaphysical commitment to one (o
r more) theorie(s) about reality, without that commitment "consciousness is duplicable"
has no meaning by itself and is not an absolute truth... are you really reading what I
write, or only what you want to read ?
Consciousness is pure 1p view, and as such is not duplicable, nor localizable. It is not
in the brain, nor in the physical activity of a brain, but in the (infinity) of the
relevant number relations. But we are used to ascribe consciousness to bodies (which
don't really exist), and so we can say in the local 3-1 view, that a consciousness has
been duplicated. That will just means that the relative conditions in which that
consciousness can manifest itself have been duplicated, like there are infinitely
multiplied and distributed in arithmetic.
In fact if we refer to bodies, the 3p is here a 1p-plural-1p-singular view, really, but
this is not relevant (especially if the discussion is on a point "before step 8/MGA)".
If we think of an AI, which can be run on different hardware, then when it is running on
different hardware in different circumstances it will have different "thoughts" and if it
is conscious will have different qualia. But in a sense it will be the same
consciousness, i.e. the same person, just in different environments.
Brent
I don't remember the motivation of the discussion, to see if the difference of terming
is relevant or not.
Bruno
Quentin
Computationalism would say that a brain is duplicable, but as soon as the
copy had
a different thought there would be two different consciousnesses.
Brent
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