On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 09 Jun 2015, at 09:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Why not? If it can emulate a specific purpose Turning machine, it
can emulate a universal Turing machine. I think Putnam's argument
for unlimited pancomputationalism implies this.
I am not convince by that argument. Show me a rock program
computing the prime numbers.
Show me a Turing machine that can compute the prime numbers
Easy but tedious, and distracting exercise.
Show me how to emulate just K, that is the function which send (x, y)
to x. it is not obvious this can be done, because y is eliminated, you
need a black hole for it, and a proof that it does not evaporate.
and I can emulate that with a rock.
Like with the pebble.
For that matter, show me an arithmetical computer in Platonia
computing the prime numbers.....
......
much less give any useful results for physics.
No new one should be expected soon, but that was not the purpose at
all.
You can't blame a coffee machine for not doing tea.
Well, if I drink only tea then I would consider a coffee machine
totally useless and discard it without further thought! So for comp!
?
You say that comp is useless, but what is your theory of mind. What is
not Turing emulable in the brain?
You can do things with all the rigour you want, but if you can't
extract any useful results, you are wasting your time. Perhaps
this is the irreconcilable difference between the physicist and
the mathematician.
Yes, I am interested in a theory of "everything", which means to me
mainly a theory which does not eliminate consciousness. I saw that
physicists avoid the question, but a bridge is born between math
and cognitive science, thanks to theoretical computer science (a
branch of math).
I am not sure I see your point. Comp is not useless, comp is the
actual theory of the materialists, and I show that contrary to a
widespread belief: materialism and computationalism are
incompatible (without adding non-comp magic).
Comp is not presented as a solution, but as a problem. In the
second part, I show the propositional solution, but you need to
understand the problem before. Actually, I think that you have seen
the problem, but want to conclude to much quickly that comp is
false. The math part shows that this is premature, especially that
QM confirms both the comp many-worlds/dreams, but also the quantum
tautologies (until now).
Comp does not confirm the many-worlds interpretation of QM.
Exact.
Comp implies trivially the many-dreams. It is QM which confirms the
many dreams aspect, and so use of it to get the measure right.
You appear to want to draw this conclusion from FPI. But in a
discussion with Liz a while back, I challenged this interpretation
of your teleportation thought experiments leading to FPI. It was
readily shown that such thought experiments were completely
orthogonal to quantum mechanics and the MWI.
No, You stopped at step 4 (which is already better than John Clark).
You need AUDA to get the math of the FPI, and to compare it to physics.
We have answered this, but you come back again on what has already
been explained in detail: please reread the posts.
Similarly for your attempt to bring quantum logic to your cause.
Quantum logic was devised by von Neumann in the context of the
collapse interpretation of QM, together with the use of projection
operators. In Everettian many-worlds interpretations, there are no
projection operators, and quantum logic does not have a footing. In
fact, it has been pointed out that there is no such thing as a
specifically "quantum" logic -- there is just ordinary predicate
logic and a theory in which some operators do not commute. When you
can derive the non-commutation of the position and momentum
operators from comp, I might be a little more impressed.
UDA formulates the problem, and by the way, the non-commutation of
some observable is already proved. Of course position and momentum are
not yet derived, and it is not clear if they will be derived.
Again, I am not proposing a new theory, I show that two old antic
theories, often confused or used simultaneously are incompatible. Then
I show that appearance of matter is already justified at the
propositional level, so comp is not yet refuted.
My feeling is that you are not interested in the mind-body problem,
but for some reason want to keep physics as *the* fundamental
science. If that is the case, you have to produce a non-comp theory
of mind.
That is less difficult that you might think. Consciousness
supervenes on the physical brain,
Only if you add some amount of magic in both the brain and matter:
which one. I ask the theory, the math, not religious mantra like
consciousness supervenes on the physical brain. Today materialist
believe that consciousness sueprvenes on the rbain *because* they
believe in mechanism. Non-comp people are usually those who consider
that the soul is made of some substance, that we have just not yet see.
and was produced by evolution over the course of time by completely
natural processes.
This uses comp. or define "natural processes".
The details of the operation of the brain, and its effect on
consciousness, are the realm of study of the neurosciences.
Computer scientists only ever confuse themselves over these quite
simple matters.
The neuro-science are based on comp. Unless you believe like Penrose
that the neuron use a non computable ability to reduce the wave
packet? is that the case? Is your theory Penrose theory?
Even Hammeroff, who believe the level is low, and quantum, is still
under the consequence of comp, but Penrose is no more indeed (but his
argument using Gödel's theorem to assert hat we are not machine is not
valid), yet his conclusion is close to mine: materialism and mechanism
does not go well together.
Bruno
Bruce
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
