LizR wrote:
meekerdb wrote: On 6/10/2015 1:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:Can you explain why such interaction is not computable? No, I was relying on your assertion that physics is not computable - which would entail that brain processes are not computable, which would imply that comp1 is false. Except there's a loophole: if comp1 means replacement by a physical object then the physics of that object is not computable either and so it might work.Yes, that does seem to follow. And the brain replacement might happen to work, but we'd have no idea how (magic? supernatural?)
Why is it that when ever someone doesn't understand something they jump to the conclusion that it must involve magic or the supernatural. It is not possible that we might simply not yet know everything?
I suspect that "physics is not computable" is the /end/ result of Brnuo's argument (comp2) - which is supposed to be a /reductio/ on the notion of comp1. So comp1 assumes that physics is computable, and that assumption leads to the result that it isn't. Which is taken as an argument against physical supervenience of consciousness on brains, although it could equally be an argument against brains performing computations.
If that is the line of reasoning, then it would help if it were made more explicit. I expect that the reason that it is not more explicit is that it is actually incoherent. If comp1 leads to the conclusion that comp1 is false, then comp1 is inconsistent. Not just false, *inconsistent*. And as Brent is fond of saying, /ex falso quodlibet/. Or better, /ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet/.
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