On 11 Jun 2015, at 03:48, Bruce Kellett wrote:
LizR wrote:
On 11 June 2015 at 12:20, Bruce Kellett
<bhkell...@optusnet.com.au LizR wrote:
I suspect that "physics is not computable" is the /end/ result
of Brnuo's argument (comp2) - which is supposed to be a
/reductio/ on the notion of comp1. So comp1 assumes that
physics
is computable, and that assumption leads to the result that it
isn't. Which is taken as an argument against physical
supervenience of consciousness on brains, although it could
equally be an argument against brains performing computations.
If that is the line of reasoning, then it would help if it were
made
more explicit. I expect that the reason that it is not more
explicit
is that it is actually incoherent. If comp1 leads to the
conclusion
that comp1 is false, then comp1 is inconsistent. Not just false,
*inconsistent*. And as Brent is fond of saying, /ex falso
quodlibet/. Or better, /ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet/.
I think it is made explicit. Bruno has often claimed that his
argument is a /reductio/ on the physical supervenience thesis,
It seemed to me that the argument was directed against the notion of
primitive physicalism, rather than just the supervenience thesis.
MGA alone is a reductio ad absurdo of the physical supervenience, but
not of comp supervenience.
I do not remember Bruno explicitly denying supervenience.
Only physical supervenience (called "supervenience" by most
(materialist) philosophers).
It would be strange if he did, since brain replacement by a computer
at the appropriate substitution level is the beginning of the
argument.
No doubt.
But, as I have argued, the argument against primitive physicalism
fails because nothing is introduced that actually depends on
primitive physicalism. That is why the whole enterprise appears to
backfire.
?
What you say does not make sense. I introduce both comp and primitive
physicalism to get the contracdition.
Physicis does not rely, indeed, on primitive physicalism, and that'w
why there is no prblem with physics at all.
The problem is for the computationalist only: they have to retrieve
physics from machine self-reference.
Then I show PA has already done the job at the propositional part.
assuming I've got that right. He is trying to show that the
assumptions of comp1 lead to a contradiction (and one of the
assumptions of comp1 is that consciousness supervenes on brains).
But there are other assumptions. Showing a contradiction only shows
that your starting point is inconsistent (assuming that all the
other stages of the reasoning are correct). It doesn't point to
*which* assumption is at fault. That comes down to metaphysics, so
it is all irrelevant for understanding the real world of experience.
I just show a problem for the computationalist, and to avoid people
makes easy conclusion, i show how machine as clever as PA can already
debunk the use of such result to argue that comp is false.
Then I am strike by the functional morphism between neoplatonism and
the discourse of the machine introspecting itself.
The point is that with comp, metaphysics can be proceeded with the
scientific way, without any metaphysical ontological commitment, but
the terms of the theory.
It seems to me that you are the one doing a metaphysical commitment,
if not, why would you like comp false, or useless, etc.
Bruno
Bruce
"You don't like my metaphsysics? That's all right -- I have a whole
draw full of alternative metaphysics available..."
** With apologies to Groucho Marx.
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