On 11 June 2015 at 11:38, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
> meekerdb wrote: > >> On 6/10/2015 1:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 10 Jun 2015, at 01:15, meekerdb wrote: >>> >>>> On 6/9/2015 11:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> You say that comp is useless, but what is your theory of mind. What is >>>>> not Turing emulable in the brain? >>>>> >>>> >>>> Its interaction with the universe. >>>> >>> >>> Are you sure it is not the interaction with God? >>> >> >> Dunno, Samiya seems to the expert on what God does. >> >> >>> Can you explain why such interaction is not computable? >>> >> >> No, I was relying on your assertion that physics is not computable - >> which would entail that brain processes are not computable, which would >> imply that comp1 is false. Except there's a loophole: if comp1 means >> replacement by a physical object then the physics of that object is not >> computable either and so it might work. >> >>> >>> Yes, that does seem to follow. And the brain replacement might happen to work, but we'd have no idea how (magic? supernatural?) I suspect that "physics is not computable" is the *end* result of Brnuo's argument (comp2) - which is supposed to be a *reductio* on the notion of comp1. So comp1 assumes that physics is computable, and that assumption leads to the result that it isn't. Which is taken as an argument against physical supervenience of consciousness on brains, although it could equally be an argument against brains performing computations. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
