On 03 Sep 2015, at 20:26, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/3/2015 8:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 02 Sep 2015, at 22:48, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/2/2015 8:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
So now you agree with me that there are different kinds and
degrees of consciousness; that it is not just a binary
attribute of an axiom + inference system.
?
Either you are conscious, or you are not.
But is a roundworm either conscious or not? an amoeba?
I don't know, but i think they are. Even bacteria, and perhaps
even some viruses, but on a different time scale than us.
If they can be conscious, but not self-conscious then there are
two kinds of "being conscious".
Yes, at least two kinds, but each arithmetical hypostases having
either "<>t" or "& p" describes a type of consciousness, I would
say.
And they all differentiate on the infinitely many version of
"[]A", be it the "[]" predicate of PA, ZF, an amoeba or you and
me ...
So if there are different kinds of consciousness then a being with
more kinds is more conscious. It seems that your dictum, "Your
either conscious or not." is being diluted away to mere slogan.
There are basically two levels, without criterion of decidability,
but with simple operational definition:
1) something is conscious if it is torturable, and arguably
ethically wrong of doing so.
So when Capt Sequra tells Wormold that he's "not of the torturable
class" he means he's not conscious. :-)
You might need to give some references here, I'm afraid.
How is this an operational defintion? What is the operation to
determine whether a being is torturable?
Yu make the torture publicly, and if you are sent to jail, the entity
is conscious, at least in the 3-1 view of the people you are living
with.
I think all invertebrates are already at that level, and in
arithmetic that might correspond to the sigma_1 complete (Turing
universality). Robinson Arithmetic, the universal dovetailer, are
at that level.
2) something is self-conscious if it is Löbian, basically he is
aware of its unnameable name. PA, ZF, are "at that level", like all
their sound recursively enumerable extensions. At that level, the
entity is able to ascribe consciousness to another, and can get the
the moral understanding of good and wrong (with or without a
forbidden fruit).
What's the operation to determine it is aware of its unamable name?
Ok, you torture a fellow, now, and all people complaining about this
can be said to have the ability to ascribe consciousness to others.
In principle you have to repeat this often to avoid the partial zombie
case. The criteria are operational in the weak sense of making the
statement plausible, as we know already that there is no definite
criterion for consciousness. We might not been able to convince an
alien about this.
Bruno
Brent
But the content of the consciousness can be extremely variable, and
then there are many different types of consciousness states. By
incompleteness, machine's psychology is transfinitely rich. The
first person self is not a machine from the machine first person
perspective. Machines are naturally non computationalist, and the
origin of consciousness is plausibly more on the side of the truth
than on the representation.
Bruno
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