On 17 Sep 2015, at 00:16, Brent Meeker wrote:



On 9/16/2015 10:39 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Sep 15, 2015 , spudboy100 via Everything List <everything-list@googlegroups.com > wrote:

​ > ​ It seems, at this point, that the time for uploading is far, far, away. It could emerge out of neuroscience research, and all that, but it doesn't feel like there is anything reliable at this point.

​Yes but exponential ​processes can do funny things, a week before uploading becomes possible it will still seem to be a very long way away, and the era where it's possible but very difficult and expensive will only last for about 15 minutes. And if Cryonics works (a big if I admit) then it doesn't matter if it happens a week after your death or a thousand years after, all the time you spent bathing in liquid nitrogen will seem instantaneous to you.

"Uploading" isn't some well defined process (except in SciFi). You could be "uploaded" today by having a team of people research your appearance, personality, thinking, preferences, speech, etc. and incorporating them into a computer program with sensory inputs and some Watson like AI. It would produce a Max Headroom like John Clark who would continue to berate Bruno for his use of pronouns and other signs of intelligence. Would it be conscious?...who knows. Would it be recognizably John Clark...sure.

Good point.

With computationalism there is no zombies, but infinitely many local zombies. In fact if consciousness, which is a first person notion, depends entirely on the FPI, and thus on the infinity of computations, as it seems to be the case, then the UD generates *only* zombies, despite from our personal perspective there is no zombie for the entity which is counterfactually correct with respect to "me". Now I am not sure if consciousness per se relies that much on the FPI, as our brain seems classical. That depends also if the filter (Galois connection) is correct. Being conscious more than two instants does rely on the FPI, though, making physics into a computation measure calculus.

Note that (comp + ~ MW => solipsisme), so MW is quite welcome with comp, it illustrates the first person plurality. The physical bottom is linear, as I hope this will be extracted in the "material" machine's pov, but there is a lot of work to do to get at that stage.

Bruno



Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Reply via email to