On 10/7/2015 11:55 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:


2015-10-07 20:46 GMT+02:00 Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>:



    On 10/7/2015 4:12 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

        But here Clark contradicts all the textbook on the subject. In
        fact all what John Clarks says here is that you cannot get a
        physical object from an arithmetical computations, which is
        trivial, but does not prove the existence of the physical
        object, as physical is a relative relational notion in arithmetic.
        Those type of argument are only the usual knocking on the table.


    Which is very good evidence for the existence of a physical object.


But it is no evidence at all about the ontological status of such object

It's ontological state is "exists". Bruno wrote above, "...does not prove the existence of the physical object, as physical is a relative relational notion in arithmetic." My point is that you don't have prove the existence of physical objects from Peano's axioms - there's much stronger evidence readily available.

Brent

... so what is it for ? Computationalism, MWI, do not deny the existence of physical objects... even subjective idealism does not deny you interact with physical object, it is the reality/ontological status of those which is questioned... so what's the point to use such argument ?

Quentin



    Brent


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