On 08 Oct 2015, at 02:25, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 10/7/2015 5:14 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Wed, Oct 7, 2015 at 4:08 PM, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net>
wrote:
On 10/7/2015 11:55 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-10-07 20:46 GMT+02:00 Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net>:
On 10/7/2015 4:12 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But here Clark contradicts all the textbook on the subject. In
fact all what John Clarks says here is that you cannot get a
physical object from an arithmetical computations, which is
trivial, but does not prove the existence of the physical object,
as physical is a relative relational notion in arithmetic.
Those type of argument are only the usual knocking on the table.
Which is very good evidence for the existence of a physical object.
But it is no evidence at all about the ontological status of such
object
It's ontological state is "exists". Bruno wrote above, "...does
not prove the existence of the physical object, as physical is a
relative relational notion in arithmetic." My point is that you
don't have prove the existence of physical objects from Peano's
axioms - there's much stronger evidence readily available.
If by stronger evidence you mean your own personal experience, this
does not count as proof of the existence of the physical object.
All your experience can be used to prove the existence of is that
thought.
Proof is for mathematicians and it's only relative to axioms.
More generally, proofs is for theoreticians, and is only relative to a
theory (or to the machine believing or assuming that theory). OK.
Evidence is from perception and if you don't accept it as evidence
you'll have a hard time getting through the morning.
The evidence for a physical reality are enough to motivate me to go
out of my bed and preparing coffee, and smelling it, and drinking it.
We don't need evidence on a primary matter, or on physicalism, for
acting in real-life, and that is nice, as we don't have any evidence
for that. I would say that on the contrary computationalism and modern
physics provide evidences for doubting about such metaphysical
conceptions of reality.
In our metaphysical/theological discussion we must keep distinct the
evidences for a physical reality (I have few doubts about them) and
evidences for physicalism, which seems today only to lead to
conceptual difficulties, if not elimination of the 1p data (cf
Dennett, by example).
Bruno
PS In fact a book by Couloubaritsis illustrates well that our
discussion here has been the main line of the whole theological
discussion by the antic and medieval philosophers, and most conflicts
are explainable in terms of confusion between different hypostases. I
will some day come bak on this. Alas the book is written in french,
and is lengthy (about 1400 pages):
http://www.amazon.com/Histoire-philosophie-ancienne-m%C3%A9di%C3%A9vale-Philosophie-ebook/dp/B00TLEOB7O/ref=asap_bc?ie=UTF8
Brent
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