On 07 Oct 2015, at 23:08, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 10/7/2015 11:55 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-10-07 20:46 GMT+02:00 Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net>:
On 10/7/2015 4:12 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But here Clark contradicts all the textbook on the subject. In fact
all what John Clarks says here is that you cannot
get a physical object from an arithmetical computations, which is
trivial, but does not prove the existence of the physical object,
as physical is a relative relational notion in arithmetic.
Those type of argument are only the usual knocking on the table.
Which is very good evidence for the existence of a physical object.
But it is no evidence at all about the ontological status of such
object
It's ontological state is "exists". Bruno wrote above, "...does not
prove the existence of the physical object, as physical is a
relative relational notion in arithmetic." My point is that you
don't have prove the existence of physical objects from Peano's
axioms - there's much stronger evidence readily available.
No, that is evidence for stable information pattern. It is at best
evidence for a sharable dream. And we want explain that stability
without invoking a mysterious ontologically prior matter. We want
extract its appearance by the computations which solves the measure
problem. Step 8 does not give much choice. using ostentation works in
physics, not in metaphysics, except to test the physical part of some
metaphysics in which physics is explained. With comp, I don't see any
other way to explain a relation between what we are conscious of and
consciousness.
Bruno
Brent
... so what is it for ? Computationalism, MWI, do not deny the
existence of physical objects... even subjective idealism does not
deny you interact with physical object, it is the reality/
ontological status of those which is questioned... so what's the
point to use such argument ?
Quentin
Brent
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