On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 9:04 PM, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> > > On 10/13/2015 6:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 6:16 PM, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> > wrote: > >> >> >> On 10/13/2015 3:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> >> >> On 14 October 2015 at 09:46, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On 10/13/2015 3:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> >>> >>> ... >>> Standard computationalism does not say anything about whether matter is >>> primary or not. It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that >>> thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism disagree. >>> They believe either that is not possible to make a computer that behaves >>> like a human because there is non-computable physics in the brain (eg. >>> Roger Penrose), or that it is possible to make a computer that behaves like >>> a human but not one that thinks like a human (eg. John Searle). >>> >>> >>> But the problem with what you say is that on this list >>> "computationalism" tends to mean much more than, "you can make a computer >>> (or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human". Bruno claims to have >>> proven that your simple statement logically entails that all of physics and >>> consciousness. But that is not so generally accepted and so when someone >>> "reject computationalism" here, it may be they are just rejecting the >>> inferences Bruno claims it entails. >>> >> >> I take Bruno's term "comp" to mean computationalism plus the conclusions >> he draws from it. >> >> >> But with that extended meaning, the following two sentences are not true: >> "It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that thinks and acts >> like a human. Those opposed to computationalism disagree." Those who >> reject (extended) computationalism, may very well agree. >> > > If someone believes computationalism does not lead to the extended > conclusions Bruno drew from it, it is on them to show where Bruno's > argument is wrong. > > > Or why it's conclusion doesn't follow necessarily - which I and others > have done. > > I missed this. Could you point to the posts where you showed this? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
