On 10/13/2015 3:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


On 14 October 2015 at 09:46, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



    On 10/13/2015 3:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

    ...
    Standard computationalism does not say anything about whether
    matter is primary or not. It says that you can make a computer
    (or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to
    computationalism disagree. They believe either that is not
    possible to make a computer that behaves like a human because
    there is non-computable physics in the brain (eg. Roger Penrose),
    or that it is possible to make a computer that behaves like a
    human but not one that thinks like a human (eg. John Searle).

    But the problem with what you say is that on this list
    "computationalism" tends to mean much more than, "you can make a
    computer (or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human".  Bruno
    claims to have proven that your simple statement logically entails
    that all of physics and consciousness.  But that is not so
    generally accepted and so when someone "reject computationalism"
    here, it may be they are just rejecting the inferences Bruno
    claims it entails.


I take Bruno's term "comp" to mean computationalism plus the conclusions he draws from it.

But with that extended meaning, the following two sentences are not true: "It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism disagree." Those who reject (extended) computationalism, may very well agree.

Brent

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